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BULGARIA

Fatherland Labor Party Policy Reported

91BA0280A Sofia BULGARIYA in Bulgarian
19 Jan 91 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Position of the Fatherland Labor Party on the Agreement Concluded by the Political Forces"]

[Text] Recently, the leadership of the Fatherland Labor Party [OPT] held a series of meetings and discussions with the heads of the main political forces, including Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] Control Council, and Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council, as well as the chairman of the Grand National Assembly, the prime minister, and the president of the Republic, at which it presented its views on the recently concluded agreement.

Bulgaria must be revived through its classical ideal. It must turn to other societies and peoples and interact with them in the name of peace and social prosperity. In the course of that process, the OPT will struggle to secure equal rights and opportunities and freedom of choice and free development for all. Most generally, the OPT is for liberalism in economics and conservatism in politics. The OPT will try to act as a conservative force that, precisely for that reason, will be able to enhance the vitality of the Bulgarian tradition, bring to light the reserves of the Bulgarian spirit, and include them in the all-European processes. The OPT will assert the great technical possibilities of our time, aimed at improving living conditions, and will oppose any kind of political utopianism or the total technologizing of life that is not consistent with the individual or with freedom. It is a group with a feeling of Bulgaria's past as a state and respect for the old cultural benefits and traditions of the country, and a look at the future against the background of the objective difficulties that accompany the democratization of sociopolitical and economic life.

The OPT signed the agreement concluded among the political forces, which deals with a number of important problems. The Grand National Assembly is also discussing and drafting important laws. On that subject, the OPT expresses the following views:

1. On the Legitimacy of the VNS [Grand National Assembly]

By the end of January, the VNS must finally formulate its position concerning its own legitimacy.

2. On the National Problem

No authorities shall make any decisions whatsoever on national and ethnic problems that would lead to nothing but destabilization and tension within society. Instead, they should concentrate their attention on implementing the agreement among political forces.

3. On Farmland

Regardless of who owns the land, the Constitution and the law must stipulate that it remains forever a territory of the Bulgarian Republic and that every landowner must observe the law.

There is no one to whom the land could be returned because, in the future, as well, it must continue to be that of its owners—private individuals organized or not in cooperatives, municipalities, and the state.

A state land fund must be created.

A deadline must be set, bearing in mind the crisis, during which farmland cannot be sold but must be used for farming.

4. On the Form of the State Structure

This problem can be resolved only with a referendum. The OPT will accept the decision of the people, remaining loyal to the traditions of national objectives, ideals, and interests.

5. On the Territorial-Settlement Structure

The OPT favors a two-step system: 1. Okrug, okoliya, or municipality, covering the territory of the former 28 okrugs, with elected leaderships. 2. A municipality or a mayoralty, with appointed managers and elected councillors.

6. On Privatization

Conditions must be created for a relatively equal start.

Every citizen must be issued a state share of privatization of any kind of state property.

All shares must be issued to specific individuals.

Tax facilities must be granted to new companies of small and medium-sized owners in agriculture and industry.

Trade, including foreign trade, must be demonopolized.

The Constitution and the law on privatization must guarantee the inadmissibility of monopolism and disloyal competition.

Privatization must parallel the development of all of the mechanisms and structures of commodity-monetary relations (stock and commodity exchanges, labor exchanges, and so forth).

Monetary reform must be immediate.

There must be an indexation of savings.

A law on state employees must be promulgated, paralleling the law on privatization.

7. On International Relations

The principles of OPT policy must include the concept of the priority of universal human virtues, which may be

defined by some as Christian, as well as the understanding that it is only countries with a high development of science, technology, and education that will be able to control their destinies. Countries that rely on their own efforts alone will be unable to attain this objective.

All efforts must be focused on providing worthy human living conditions in the new world and ensuring the further development of creative opportunities and preserving the spirit of European humaneness and mores. The protection of human dignity is the scale of all progress. Without moral commitment, such tasks cannot be carried out.

The path from Bulgaria to Europe is its own and goes through cooperation with the countries that are already members of the European Community.

Relations aimed at attaining the following must be established: full membership in the European Community, the IMF, and GATT; Balkan cooperation; good-neighbor relations among states.

8. On the Armed Forces

They must speed up the debate and adopt a law on national security and the status of officers that would, on the one hand, guarantee the development of a modern, adequately large, well-armed, and combat-capable Army, ready to defend our national sovereignty, and, on the other, secure for the people who have dedicated themselves to the military profession a social status consistent with their responsibilities.

9. On the Police

Adoption of the law on the police should be accelerated. This law would guarantee law and order in the country and protect the property of the citizens and their individual dignity and rights.

The status of people employed by the police must be made consistent with the standards adopted by countries with developed democracies.

The police must be structured on the principle of centralism and be the exclusive carriers of the functions of providing armed protection.

This position taken by the Fatherland Labor Party was presented also to the mass information media at a press conference held on 15 January.

Circulation Figures for Newspapers

91BA0277A Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian
18 Jan 91 p 5

[Article by Yuri Velez: "Newspaper Situation in 1991"]

[Text] The results of the subscription campaign that ended on 7 December indicate the existence of definite hits in the newspaper boom: DUMA and DEMOKRATSIYA. The former (216,951 subscriptions

and 148,015 sold at newsstands, for a total of 364,966) was able to breathe life into a newspaper that had been dead for decades, RABOTNICHESKO DELO, and to give a certain professionalism to conservative views and the need for something interesting, fresh, and active. The second (140,720 and 118,510, respectively, for a total of 259,230) proved Havel's view that, in a society based on total lies, any moral gesture becomes a political one; even if a certain cause begins with nothing and is carried out not entirely professionally, it could still enjoy huge social support. Metaphorically speaking, DUMA filled the information vacuum in society, and DEMOKRATSIYA the moral one. The total circulation of the two dailies is slightly under last year's combined RABOTNICHESKO DELO and DUMA.

The very fact that the party organs, proverbial for their attacks on each other, became notorious proves the obvious popularity of polarized thinking and the lack of social harmony in the acceptance of the political doctrine of the "center." Personally, I find quite positive the fact that DUMA retained its leading role of a real social force and an institution that counterbalances the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], which is withdrawing from the political stage. This protects our society from any kind of hypothetical leaning toward a "new totalitarianism."

TRUD, the trade union daily, was third in the circulation rating (156,475), significantly outstripping its colleague and rival PODKREPA (20,614). ZEMYA, representing rural socialist journalism (117,173), prevailed over the agrarian ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME (63,032) and NARODNO ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME (38,533). OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK, leaning toward objectivity and centrism, had a circulation of 61,872. Waiting for good Uncle Maxwell [British publisher Robert Maxwell], VECHERNI NOVINI had a circulation of 48,168. The Komsomol is clearly leaning in the direction of MLA-DEZH (18,441), which is at the bottom of the list of central dailies.

It is easy to predict that, among the weeklies, STUR-SHEL (227,346) is successful with its topical folk humor, which is something that has always been close to the Bulgarian outlook. 168 CHASA (149,728) emphasized elegant and refined irony and parodies, as well as "business" complexes, total rejection of the old journalistic models, and adoption of modern Western ones—high-quality analyses, journalistic investigations entirely based on the interest of the readers, and "something for everyone" coverage, all in simple language. The success of POGLED (222,860) and ANTENI (102,994) is traditional. Another extremely successful group of publications includes the topic spin-offs of PARALELI-BTA (132,116), such as KOY SI TI? (217,874), KLUB 15 (80,232), PSIKHOTRONIKA (167,868), FENOMEN (67,445), and AZ I TI (101,587), which are satisfying the age-old and unsatisfied curiosity of the Bulgarian people about worldly, sexual, unknown, and unexplainable events and "Western" features—that is, "mass culture." Traditional success has also come to sports and women's papers: SPORT (100,142), SPORT TOTO (112,314),

FUTBOL (95,246), and NIE, ZHENITE (98,528). The areas of "high culture" do not have mass readership, which is entirely normal: LITERATUREN FORUM (12,278), the openly elitist and complex KULTURA (13,008), and the "heavy" high-quality DEBATI (4,316). VEK 21 (19,948) instantly found its place in the intellectual area.

In front of the RP [Pazprostpanenie na pechata—Press Distribution Organization] stand, I heard the following conversation: "Do you carry NOVA ERA?" "No, but we carry MISUL." What is this? Is it the attraction of opposites or something else? The extreme left NOVA ERA offers something that hardly resembles journalism but that has a rather good circulation, 55,598, which proves the existence of social entropy and chaos in the mass mind. The extreme-right MISUL (21,747), conversely, relies on a strictly defined readership circle. The similarity of views of the "real opposition" outside the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] and the "healthy forces" within the BSP, as well as their flirtation with the Movement for Objective Television, is truly a phenomenon worthy of consideration. One way or another, communism is on its way out because KOMUNISTICHESKO DELO has a circulation of only 5,084.

Therefore, the social roles of journalism are within their normal boundaries: yesterday, the newspaper as an agitator, educator, and propagandist (a familiar role); the newspaper as information, as a means of communication; the newspaper as knowledge; the newspaper as an attraction; the newspaper as an emotional state of mind; the newspaper as an esthetic pleasure; and the newspaper as a social signal and a reaction. Usually, a single newspaper in today's press combines a few of these roles, but one of them prevails. Success comes with the proper "mixing" of the components, based on the frame of mind and the expectations of the audience.

Opinion Poll Reveals Ethnic Attitudes

91BA0279A Sofia BULGARIYA in Bulgarian
19 Jan 91 p 4

[Report: "Are We the Biggest Pessimists?"]

[Text] Under that heading ["Are We the Biggest Pessimists?"], REPORTER 7 carried in its issue No. 1 of 4 January 1991 a report that was part of a Christmastime study of Eastern Europe conducted by the world famous institute Gallup, and, in our country, the Center for the Study of Democracy. Following are some of the more characteristic findings, which hardly need additional comment.

"The first phenomenon revealed in the study of opinions, classified by ethnic and religious group, is that of differences in the degree of optimism and pessimism. Two main groups become apparent: the pessimists—the Bulgarians and the Pomaks; and the optimists—the Turks and the Gypsies. This is also seen in their answers to the question 'What kind of year do you expect 1991 to be?'"

This also affects the answers to the question of what kind of year 1991 will be from an economic standpoint. The Bulgarians and the Pomaks once again are in the group of pessimists: 70.3 percent and 72.7 percent, respectively, believe that this will be a year of hardship, whereas the Turks and the Gypsies show greater optimism. Only 53.7 percent and 28.4 percent, respectively, of the surveyed Turks and Gypsies are pessimistic. As for the situation in the country over the past 12 months, more than 90 percent of the Pomaks and 80 percent of the Bulgarians believe that it has worsened, whereas the respective figures for the Turks and the Gypsies are 68.6 percent and 45.4 percent. Fear of unemployment, once again, is highest among Bulgarians—75.6 percent—as opposed to 65.7 percent for the Turks and 23.7 percent for the Gypsies.

	Better	Worse	Same
Bulgarians	24.7%	50.8%	13.4%
Pomaks	18.2%	54.5%	27.3%
Turks	31.3%	41.8%	16.4%
Gypsies	31.8%	9.1%	27.3%

The expectation of possible military conflicts throughout the world in 1991 also varies. Whereas no more than 25.8 percent of Bulgarians and 22.2 percent of Pomaks believe that the year will be peaceful, the respective figures for the Turks and the Gypsies are 38.5 percent and 38.1 percent. Only 20 percent of Turks and 19 percent of Gypsies expect a troubled year, as compared to 46.3 percent of Bulgarians.

Also different is the extent of trust in political parties and their leaders. Whereas 21 percent of Bulgarians, 22.7 percent of Gypsies, and 27.3 percent of Pomaks continue to trust the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], only 3 percent of the Turks do. Trust in the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] was expressed by 24.3 percent of Bulgarians and 36.4 percent of Pomaks, as opposed to 17.9 percent of Turks and 18.2 percent of Gypsies. It is interesting to note that, aside from these two political giants, only the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union] enjoys support by the Turkish ethnic group—4.5 percent.

The DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] continues to benefit from the exceptional trust of the Turkish ethnic group. Unlike in the period immediately following the elections, however, its influence has been reduced substantially. The studies conducted by the TsID [Center for the Study of Democracy] in August indicated that 87 percent of the Turkish and 74 percent of the Pomak population approved of the activities of the DPS. Currently, these percentages are 55.2 and 9.1, respectively.

Nonetheless, faced with the dilemma of who to vote for, 70 percent of the Turks once again expressed their support of the DPS. There was a decline among the

Pomaks because only 9 percent intend to repeat their vote for that movement. Obviously, by the end of last year, the Bulgarian-Muslim vote had been redirected to the SDS and amounted to 45.5 percent. Something similar has occurred with the Turks, inasmuch as more than 20 percent of them have expressed their willingness to vote for the SDS. The BSP continues to head the electoral list exclusively among the Gypsies, with 45 percent, as opposed to 36.4 percent for the SDS.

In terms of attitude toward political leaders, Zhelyu Zhelev is the only one with a high rating among all ethnic groups: 18.6 percent of the Bulgarians, 18.5 percent of the Turks, and 27.3 percent of the Pomaks approve of his activities. Akhmed Dogan, the leader of the DPS, has reason to be seriously concerned, however, because only 22 percent of the Turks and 9.1 percent of the Pomaks approve of him.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Current Political Conditions in Slovakia Clarified

91CH0365A Prague FORUM in Czech
12 Feb 91 pp 8-9

[Article by Peter Schutz: "What Is at Stake in Slovakia?"]

[Text] Without a doubt, it is the same thing as in Bohemia. That is understandable; we are building a common state and the lot we share is coming to terms with the sad legacy of our past. Here are two priorities—a radical economic reform and unfortunately, quite unexpectedly also the preservation of our common state. The latter issue is a more than unwelcome burden; the reform by itself should be quite enough. Luckily, our state is in no danger of an immediate breakup, nevertheless, when we assess the current developments in Slovakia, its political parties and personages, they all must also be viewed from this particular point of view. I realize that I have not invented the wheel; these priorities have been evident and well known for quite a while. Just the same, they must be emphasized and brought to attention also because not all of us can see and recognize them. On the contrary, some forces prefer aims that often are completely contradictory but that are wrapped in nationalist and populist demagoguery. National self-determination, protection of our social guarantees and similar slogans represent an actual threat especially in Slovakia, mainly because they are intentionally presented as the will of the majority of the nation. Thus, this involves a difficult battle to be fought for the consciousness of the common citizen and thus, trailblazing for the reform.

The veracity of this statement is confirmed in a unique way by the results of a poll recently published by AISA, a group for independent social analysis. To put it mildly, those results are not flattering for Slovakia, and even harsher expressions could be found for that. The differences in the approaches of the two republics to economic

and social problems are enormous. The Czech Republic is better off in almost every point of the poll. In Slovakia the reform is considered far less important than in Bohemia; social equality is stressed here; a certain aversion is felt against the principle of rewards according to merit; there is less willingness to accept responsibility for one's life; on the contrary, the [Slovaks] would gladly leave it up to the tender mercy of the state. It is frightening to learn that so long as the Czech population agrees on principle with a liberal concept of the reform, the orientation predominating in Slovakia focuses on an economy with socialist aspects. And that after forty years of "real socialism"!

This goes hand in hand with a greater determination of Slovak citizens to fight and use economic strikes in order to push through their social demands. It is an absolutely incredible fact that the Slovak population sets as the minimum living standard an amount higher than its current average income. I think that these few data convincingly confirm that in Slovakia trailblazing for reform will be a Sisyphean and preeminently overriding task. It is an inadmissible argument that, due to certain particulars, some kind of a slower variant must be planned for the Slovaks. If the reform proceeds at different speeds in the two republics, it would indisputably result in a total disintegration of our federation. Furthermore, I believe that the specificity of the Slovak situation is nothing more than the exact sum total of the above-mentioned and perhaps many other similar, not overly optimistic facts.

With that in mind, one must rate the movements on the Slovak scene which, unfortunately, demonstrates traits that we would seek in vain anywhere in Europe. We are witnessing a completely unique phenomenon unprecedented in the world. In view of the impending social impacts of the liberalization process, public confidence in the Slovak government and particularly, in its premier remains high, while the popularity of the VPN [Public Against Violence] movement, which delegated to that government most of its ministers as well as the premier, is basically experiencing a steady decline, with some greater or lesser fluctuations. Again, it is not really difficult to explain this absurd phenomenon. Here we have in the first place the personality of Vladimir Meciar who is controversial from the standpoint of the federation. If the coefficient of his popularity in the Czech lands equals almost zero, the situation in Slovakia is exactly the opposite. With the greatest probability this type of an astute, impulsive, and eloquent politician suits best the thinking and temperament of the population east of the Morava River. Another reason for this political anomaly is without any doubt the populist tone of the steps taken by Meciar's cabinet, which are the exact opposite of the rigorous procedure of the "federals." I am afraid that the 280 million Czech korunas for the town of Prievidza, additional millions for inefficient agricultural production, and munificent promises all around will end with an unpleasant deficit budget. From the point of view of the reform, such measures are

unfortunate. To silence social unrest with state alms, that is a blind alley that only tends to increase the number of supplicants with their hands outstretched—and, moreover, in the current situation it will be of a very short duration. Pressure must be exerted on the government promptly to stop this policy. The only question is, who will exert such pressure?

In direct conjunction with the slipping credibility of the VPN, speculations recently cropped up that Vladimir Meciar might be elected chairman of the VPN Council of Slovakia already at its next congress scheduled to take place next month in Topolcany. It is true that in the greatest probability his accession to that office would stop the decline of that movement's popularity. However, such a consideration is very shortsighted and in my opinion, also unrealistic. It is unrealistic not because I have any false illusions that the delegates to the VPN summit might support Fedor Gal, although the uncritical admiration for the "Man of the Year 1990" may not manifest itself so glaringly in the politically more sophisticated environment of the congress. In No. 3 of RESPECT Mr. Zitny offered a similar scenario for that gambit. However, unlike him, I think that this change will not take place. Mr. Meciar is intelligent enough to avoid risking his popularity by accepting a position that in fact is good for nothing. It is generally known that as premier, he hardly consults the Council about his decisions and policies, and does not seek anyone's opinion. I cannot see one good reason for his interest in that post.

In the context of the recent Civic Forum [OF] congress, such a decision would be extremely ill advised. The strengthening of the rightwing line and of the position of Vaclav Klaus as the head of the OF directly forces one to ask how the further coalition and cooperation of the two decisive protagonists of the federal policymaking would work if Meciar were elected chairman of the VPN Council. Mutual "sympathies" of both those personalities would sooner or later have to result in further mutual condemnations of the two movements that in the beginning were so close; in the final analysis, this would weaken the federation as such. There is no need to stress in particular that the OF and the VPN are the only guarantors of our common state. Therefore, the liberal and competent Fedor Gal, who communicates with every OF faction, has no reasonable alternative at this moment.

In spite of these facts, or precisely because of them, certain circles undoubtedly do not conceal their efforts to capture the offices of both the premier and the chairman of the VPN Council in the person of Vladimir Meciar. In addition to I. Cibula's tenacious campaign in NARODNA OBRODA, which is indistinguishable from the past bootlicking and servility shown by communist journalists to the party leadership, it is especially the attempt by the so-called Trnava group within the VPN. This extremely anticommunist faction, which puts on strident rightwing airs, provides a glaring example of political immaturity and dilettantism. I do not know what to think about an individual who endorses the

rightwing line and at the same time, wants to guarantee social security. However, his most characteristic trait is the "national" program which may also be compared with that of the Slovak National Party [SNS]. The congress will attempt to prevent this group from attaining supremacy and from endangering Fedor Gal's position, which is its main objective.

The deformations and the operettalike character of the Slovak political scene are fully revealed already by a cursory glance at its other actors. It is a sad truth that, with the exception of the VPN, there in fact is no party or movement right or left of center that would as much as resemble the European model. In the current atmosphere everyone feels the compunction to accentuate distinctly enough his or her national character. To some extent, that is understandable because one cannot swim against the tide....

And then we have here two Christian democratic movements; one is Slovak and the other Hungarian. It is almost a tragicomedy that they cannot unite; their different nationalities pose an insurmountable obstacle. No wonder, their common ideological orientation notwithstanding, their interests often are entirely antagonistic. The Christian Democratic Movement [KHD] would be more appropriately called the KNS—Christian National Party. It is an open secret that after the next parliamentary elections it will no longer be interested in representation in the federal government. I regard it as a transitional institution with no future. This follows directly from the philosophy of the "independent chair" which is Mr. Carnogursky's basic programmatic orientation. At present this movement is quietly working to expand its election base by playing on the religious feelings of the Slovak population, particularly the less educated strata, in order to gain decisive influence on Slovak politics already eighteen months from now. It will take a long time for the Slovak Christian movement to acquire the parameters of its sister parties in the established Western democracies.

The SNS is recovering from its serious debacle in municipal elections. That comes as a surprise, if we recall the atmosphere of intensified emotions during the voting on the language law. Today this relic from the 19th century has no other analogy in Europe except for the Vatra Romanesca organization in Romania. Let us hope that by blowing into hot cinders of national intolerance against the Czechs and Hungarians as well as by the programmatic resuscitation of nostalgia about the Slovak State they will slowly become short of breath. By removing the "enfant terrible" Moric from the office of the chairman, the intellectual minority in the leadership in all probability wants give the party some acceptable image. Undreamed-of new opportunities are opening for the SNS in the area of social demagoguery where it can point out the different impacts of the reform in the two republics and exploit the above-mentioned lower preparedness of the Slovak population for social shocks. It has every precondition for that; the enormous number of

former Communists in the ranks of the "loyal nationalists" is an ample guarantee of that.

It is difficult to say anything new about the Communists; they proclaimed themselves reformists, but essentially they always remain the same. A warning sign is the 24 percent of mayoral offices they grabbed thanks to the low participation in the elections in Slovakia. Their profound defensive in the first months after the revolution is long forgotten. They are attacking the reform from every angle; they drag to university lecterns herds of normalized economists who then compete on the pages of PRAVDA in inventing third roads, alternative scenarios and misleading, often ridiculous economic theories. All that is done for a single purpose—to destabilize the situation even more and to undermine the already fragile structures of the reform in Slovakia. A special warning is their massive penetration into agencies of our state administration now being organized or into executive boards of joint stock companies. A way must be found to prevent this phenomenon or at least, to minimize it.

A special chapter that cannot be ignored concerns our press and mass media in general. I doubt that there is another country in the world where a daily financed by the government can launch a systematic campaign against its most essential objectives. NARODNI OBRODA, which is the case in point here, may on the one hand properly praise and emphasize all subsidies granted by the government, no matter who their recipients or what their amount may be. After all, that agrees with the train of thought and views of its editors who, on the other hand, express themselves by their unbridled antireform crusade in which NARODNA OBRODA does not lag behind even the familiar publications of the past, above all, the insuperable PRAVDA. PRACE, which also is doing its damndest, has lost nothing by the expiration of the ROH [Revolutionary Trade Union Movement]; on the contrary, as publisher, the militant aggressive Confederation of Trade Union Associations with its ambitions for power suits its cryptocommunist editors just fine. The antireformist orientation is the basic symptom common to all newspapers published in Slovakia, with VEREJNOST as the only partial exception. Manipulations of social consciousness are not restricted to economic information alone; for instance, they acquired a monstrous form even before the language law was discussed. The absolute champions of disinformation are the "nationally" oriented tabloids. Screenings and investigations, thus far reserved for a small group of federal politicians, deputies and the highest echelons of justice, would unquestionably help clear the air in the editorial offices of Slovak dailies, weeklies as well as radio and television. However, there is little hope for that because the Slovak political representation is opposed even to conducting screening on its own. Still, I am firmly convinced that our public life simply cannot avoid that unpleasant operation. It is a necessity, and the longer we shall wait to face it, the more

difficult will be our transition from totalitarianism to genuine democracy. That, too, is now at stake in Slovakia.

Observations on Rise of Moravian Nationalism

91CH0351A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
6 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by Jiri Hanak: "How Many Republics?"]

[Text] It has barely been six weeks since our state experienced the birth of two autonomous republics and its political life is once more increasing in scope. The constitutional surgeons do not exclude the possibility that this time there will be triplets. This is a daring calculation involving such a relatively old mother.

The idea is that Moravia is to be born; more precisely stated, its new or old-new statute is to come into being. Only a person of small format and limited scope would deny Moravia the right to a territorial or social arrangement in a state in which Moravia would find its corresponding place. As a result of the existing arrangement of things, this country has undoubtedly suffered. Anyone who saw present-day Brno saw a dragged-out, gray, devastated Cinderella. If a citizen of Brno notes, with a sigh, that "on the Danube (and on the Vltava) palaces tower which are made of my blood and my sweat," he is not citing a poet, but rather is commenting on the status of things. The two decades between 1969 and 1989 were not equally stupid and cruel for the entire republic. This period had its most cruel and stupid effect in Moravia. Prague and Bratislava always shared financial resources in a fraternal manner, that is to say, not with fairness. Of the smaller quantity of resources left over in Bohemia, Brno used to receive an amount which we had become accustomed to calling an alms donation.

This status of things is certainly known to the Czech and federal governments. If our information is correct, then there is also no fundamental opposition in the Czech Government against rectifying the sins of the communist years. If I were to express an opinion regarding the method of rectification, I would say: It should take the form of anything and whatever it takes to satisfy Moravia which is not in conflict with good common sense.

In the words of Prince Hamlet of Denmark, that is precisely what is amiss. Common sense is taking a vacation, having been extremely exhausted by the parcelling of the Czechoslovak Republic which was previously unified and inseparable. Common sense takes a vacation the instant there is serious talk of three republics, in other words, of a triple federation, more specifically: of three republic governments and one federal government, of three republic parliaments and one federal parliament, of four types of jurisdictions; a Slovak jurisdiction, a Czech jurisdiction, a Moravian jurisdiction, and a federal jurisdiction. Does this appear sufficiently crazy to you? To me it does. Does it fulfill the condition according to which we would serve as a target

of ridicule for the normal world? You are not wrong. As early as the period of the hyphen war, foreigners used to tease us with such questions as "How long is the hyphen so that we might not commit a faux pas in pronouncing the name of your state?"

I am not sufficiently clear on the basis upon which Moravia should be proclaimed a republic. It is not possible to utilize the principle of nationality. Moravians are certainly not a nation. Is the idea to bring about a "Moravian republic" as a reward for previously suffered wrongs? This looks like heresy which is rarely seen even in the pastures of our political life. So it should be to spite the Slovaks? This would be too reminiscent of Swejk: "You killed my uncle, so here is the back of my hand." Even the greatest connoisseur of that which is different could only reconcile this with political thinking with difficulty. Then why? The only possible answer is: because.

The practical disintegration of the state into two autonomous republics, confirmed by the jurisdictional capitulation of the Federal Assembly in December of last year, ignited a fuse, the end of which is not in sight. No one knows what lies at its end. What lies at the end of a fuse can only be assumed: an explosive charge. It can explode at any time, at once, or in segments. Does the creation of a "Moravian republic" preclude a "Silesian republic"? On the contrary, it virtually promotes it; After all, Silesia is certainly a specific country with its own history, which could even be the envy of many an autonomous republic. And what about the ethnicity we have—which runs into the thousands and possibly millions? What will happen if its strongest numerical component is subject to the process of self-awareness and begins to be heard? In the final analysis, if anyone seriously speaks of a republic without a nation, is the idea of a republic with a nation which does not have any territory so fantastic?

This is not a filibuster against the just and undeniable demands of Moravia; this is a filibuster against people who are easily and irresponsibly releasing the genie of antiquated nationalism from the bottle. After all, an inseparable part of vital compromise is also a healthy toughness and a knowledge of the limitations as to how far a compromise can go.

Our state is lying on the operating table today and is anticipating the Moravian cesarean section. It is possible that the republic may not even leave the operating table. The inflammation of the constitution is reaching the acute stage. Information from along the Morava River regarding the necessity for an agreement between the republics indicates that not even this medical finding can be eliminated by purely ambulatory treatment.

Havel on Childhood, More Recent Past

91CH0389A Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak
18 Feb 91 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Vaclav Havel by Branislav Janik; place and date not given: "Face to Face With Vaclav Havel: 'People Are Often Wiser Than Many Politicians'"—first paragraph is NARODNA OBRODA introduction]

[Text] We walk through a long hall toward a high, white door. Through large windows on the left can be seen the orange glow of lamps in the snow-clad city whose sounds do not reach up to this height. I open the door to a small study appointed with dark, modern furniture. A somewhat short man rises from behind a desk by the window. "Good evening, I am Janik from NARODNA OBRODA." "Good evening, Havel, pleased to meet you," he says with a shy smile. The President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Vaclav Havel.

[Janik] Mr. President, what memories do you have of your childhood, family, parents?

[Havel] It is difficult to recount memories of my childhood, my parents, in a couple of sentences. But somehow lately I have been going back to that time more often. It so happened that recently I read the manuscript of my biography written by Eda Kriseova as commissioned by a Western publisher. Although she had very little time to work on it, she very conscientiously gathered all kinds of material, studied various notes of my mother and father, our family chronicles, correspondence, many things which I had never seen.

When I read her compilation, it made me see my childhood and youth from a different point of view. I realized how many things my parents hid from me in order to protect me. They were, as was at one time the custom to say derogatively, the bourgeoisie. Father was an entrepreneur, a fact which the regime later used as an argument against me. And as an entrepreneur, he was a victim of the class struggle in the fifties. I was a boy growing up at that time, and I worked because I was not able to study. My parents obviously did not want to burden me with talk about all the persecutions to which they were subjected.

I sensed and saw some things, of course, but I have learned about it in all its perverse diversity only now, as an adult. My parents must have suffered a lot. That is why today I have a better understanding of people who justifiably demand redress for past wrongs, I understand the need for restitution and nonjudicial rehabilitations. It used to be, to tell you the truth, something alien to me. I always used simply to say when somebody took something from me, the Good Lord provideth, the Good Lord taketh away. Only now am I able only to comprehend the depth of the problem better. I understand what it means when you work all your life, collect things dear to your heart, buy paintings, inherit some heirlooms, and all of a sudden strangers come and take everything away by force. For such people it is a terrible and brutal intrusion

into their private life, into their hierarchy of values. All these things I have paradoxically come to understand only a long time after the class struggle and persecutions ended, a long time after my parents died. Today I try to exculpate myself retroactively for having been sometimes rude toward them, for sometimes making fun of them and for making such kind of jokes, for being such a provocative, cryptosocialist element in our family.

[Janik] You have never hidden the fact that the mainstay of your life is your wife, to whom you wrote 144 letters from prison between 1979 and 1982. What role has she played and does she now play in your life?

[Havel] I have known Olga since I was 16 years old, and she became my partner in life. I have already spoken about my parents; my mother was a very creative and energetic person and she obviously had a dominant influence on me. A psychologist would tell you that people who have had such mothers need to be dominated to some degree by a woman even in later life. Olga, because of her nature, has fulfilled that role for me. She has always been, and is, regardless of my various habits, someone I can count on. She is a person of whom I have been always a little afraid, with whom I have consulted about everything, from whom I expected opinions. Olga was the first script editor and critic of my literary efforts, a critical judge of my activities. Simply, Olga is my lifelong partner.

[Janik] In 1963, the Theatre on the Balustrade held the premiere of your first full-length play, the Garden Party. Why did you choose the theatre as your profession, what led you to it?

[Havel] It was actually by happenstance. Although—it was by chance, and it was not. For many reasons, of all the literary genres writing plays is what I like best. I am a systematic person with a feel for construction, which is necessary for dramatic works more than for prose or poetry. Another reason is that I am basically a reserved person and a playwright is always somebody who can hide behind his characters and is not out in front himself. The theatre and I did not choose each other by chance, although the external reasons were basically fortuitous. My friend and I wrote a play when we were serving in the army, actually in order to be able to rehearse it and perform it with an army ensemble and play hooky from training sessions. Later I became a prop man in the ABC Theater. I went there because I did not know what else to do since they did not accept me in any school thanks to my background. Jan Werich knew my father and so he arranged work in the theatre for me. There I breathed the atmosphere that spoke to me and never left me.

[Janik] When once you were to talk about yourself you said that it was a diabolical task. In spite of that view, can you look at yourself from a certain distance, so to speak, and tell us who is Vaclav Havel?

[Havel] To step outside oneself and judge oneself is very difficult and truly diabolical for many reasons. One of

them is the fact that I know myself the best and therefore know what a tangled combination of varied and even very contradictory traits I am. It is very difficult to compress oneself into some schema, a formula, into an intelligible essay. I feel myself to be a mixture of very contradictory traits. I am a very private person, basically shy, and in spite of that I became president, which is a highly public function. I became one during a revolutionary time, when I had to talk to crowds in the squares. It is a paradox, my life is full of them, and I am probably full of them myself. It is therefore difficult for me to give a balanced assessment of myself. The greatest paradox is indeed the fact that all my life I have learned to observe and evaluate things somewhat critically, with scepticism, I see rather the absurd, black dimensions of the world and life, but as president I am in a situation where I must dispense hope and give strength.

[Janik] You mentioned your reticence, but the opposition gathered around you and you were its moral leader. Now in a polarizing society you are once again an integrating factor. Is not this unenviable situation a heavy burden?

[Havel] It is a burden, but I am convinced that it is my duty implicit in the presidential oath and the status of the president, who has to protect by all means the stability of the state, its prosperity and integrity. I swore to that and, to put it somewhat loftily, I take my job seriously.

[Janik] In your 1984 essay "Politics and Conscience" you admitted to being an adherent of "antipolitical politics," politics from "below," politics of the people. At that time you were interested in politics as an observer and critic, not as the creator. Another paradox of your life, Mr. President, is that you are now that creator. In spite of that, do you still hold the same view?

[Havel] Yes, I still do. I am convinced even now that politics is service to the people, service to the community, service to the community of men. It cannot be merely the technology of power, the sole purpose of which is to have as much of it as possible. The main purpose and meaning of politics is to serve. I thought so then, and I still think so today. We are really touching here on another paradox of my life. That is, I have been talking for so long as an "outsider" who only observed and criticized practical politicians, until fate put me in their place and said: So show us how it should be done. And how I am doing must be judged by others. I am always trying to remain the person that I am. Of course, this office and politics in general place certain demands on a person. One must correct and control oneself. There are situations, for example, when joking is out of place, particularly my type of humor which is not always readily understood by everybody. I was recently talking in Slovakia about the future, and I also touched on the fact that we still do not know what the role of the president will be under the new constitution, what his authority will be. I jokingly said that maybe we shall

have a king instead of a president. One Slovak newspaper more or less seriously wrote that Havel wants to restore the Kingdom of Bohemia and make Slovakia subordinate to it. To put it briefly, in these matters one must have a little more control over oneself, realize that one has another audience. One must become accustomed to being followed by the domestic as well as the foreign mass media. One must adjust the way of expressing oneself accordingly and must know that it is not proper to be blunt, and that information must be worked with judiciously. Unfortunately, this puts constraints on a person, but it is only a matter of form. I try not to let it affect the substance, not to become somebody other than I was before.

[Janik] But at the same time you wrote in that essay that "antipolitical politics" is a highly impractical proposition, very difficult to apply in everyday life, although you do not know another, better alternative. Do you still agree with that today?

[Havel] During the dissident times it was indeed very difficult, because it meant persecution, many sacrifices, and great risks. To tell the truth, today and every day I come to the realization that it is no easier now, in my function as president. But I also think that I cannot give up certain basic principles. Under the pressure of all the possible circumstances, the manner, speed, or method of bringing them to life may change, but it is important for me not to give up the substance.

[Janik] No doubt you are familiar with the book *The Taste of Power* by Ladislav Mnacko. May we ask you, Mr. President, how does power taste?

[Havel] I am affected more by the unpleasant aspects of power. I am even becoming convinced that even some of its seemingly pleasant aspects are becoming unpleasant for me. I like to make my own coffee, I like to choose my own suit in the store, I like to walk down the street and look in the shop windows, go into a tavern, observe people. This normal way of life has been radically changed for me. Somebody is always with me, somebody is always doing things for me. Maybe most people think that this is something extremely pleasant, but for me it is truly uncomfortable. I am fighting for the chance to be able to do something myself, for example, drive my own car, but I have not been successful. Perhaps if I were a president somewhere else, who knows, maybe in Switzerland, I would have more chance to taste the pleasant aspects of power.

[Janik] Which problem of our internal political situation weighs on you the most?

[Havel] The problems are many. There is the problem of the constitutional structure of our state, social problems which will come with the economic reform, problems with the inertia of the bureaucracy, the slow pace at which everything is changing, etc. It seems to me that all these problems have a common denominator, the same characteristic feature, and that is the general frustration

and hopelessness felt by society. As if after the revolutionary enthusiasm and joy at having overturned the totalitarian regime we had quickly sobered up and cooled off. I know that the situation is not simple, that everything cannot be changed in one day, that many things are difficult. These problems are intertwined, we succeed in solving one and immediately come up against another one which was hidden behind it. All that creates an atmosphere of a certain discontent, and that is precisely what I consider to be the most serious problem. If our common effort is to be successful, people cannot engage in it with apathy, without enthusiasm and trust. But an atmosphere of this kind erodes trust and that will make everything all the more difficult.

[Janik] Do you think, Mr. President, that this is already a dominant trend?

[Havel] I do not think that it is that catastrophic. I believe in the good spirit of our public. I see that in comparison with other countries, our people are coping with many problems with a more sportsmanlike attitude and look at them from a relatively broader point of view. From the thousands of letters that I get I am becoming convinced that people are very reasonable, often more reasonable than the politicians. Therefore I do not think that it is the general state of mind. I look at it only as an atmosphere which appears here and there and which I consider dangerous.

[Janik] In 1968 you used to dream about a free, peace-loving Europe, one that is not divided into blocs. Is this beautiful vision of yours, as you called it, closer today?

[Havel] Certainly it is. New, great focal points of uncertainty are appearing, to be sure; I am thinking, for example, about future developments in the Soviet Union, the situation in the Near East, as well as certain tensions which arose following the fall of the totalitarian regimes in our part of Europe. It will be, of course, a long time before we reach paradise, but after all, it is well known that there will never be paradise on earth; nonetheless, that vision has unexpectedly become closer. Europe is no longer divided by any curtain, it is no longer the world's arsenal, it is no longer the place where war threatens at any moment, endangering the whole world. When I recall last year's meeting in Paris, the summit of the countries of the Helsinki process, where heads of 35 countries formed a friendly association, I consider that to be the great change which in 1986 I truly did not anticipate.

We finished our tea. The 45 minutes that the president had reserved for NARODNA OBRODA were over. We are leaving, but we are left with the feeling that we have spent very, very little time in this pleasant and genial visit and that we have spoken only a little with our host.

HUNGARY

Mayor Delays Passage of Capital City Law

91CH0376A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
1 Jan 91 p unknown

[Text] "Budapest has suffered serious damage because of delayed legislation. To this date the affairs of the capital are not being governed by law," Gabor Demszky said at a noon press conference. "The financial situation has not been clarified. Autonomous governing bodies are unable to conduct substantive negotiations with investors because no one knows the extent to which districts, the capital, and the state may exercise authority. No business transactions can be consummated, and no business organizations can be established without such knowledge."

Demszky announced that the autonomous governing bodies of the capital and of the various administrative districts of Budapest had reached an agreement as reflected in an amendment package to be submitted to the parliament. He mentioned "liberoveto" [as published] as the most essential provision of the proposal. It prohibits the capital city autonomous government from promulgating decrees unless they are agreed upon by the districts.

Ferenc Wekler, chairman of the parliamentary committee on autonomous government said that "although five legislative proposals establishing the fundamental scope of the government of the capital are being debated by the National Assembly, additional proposals are needed to enable autonomous governing bodies to begin establishing their financial and management concepts for this year." Representative Wekler confirmed that autonomous governing bodies could hardly become operational unless basic principles concerning the distribution of funds are clarified.

District mayors present at the press conference also stressed the fact that proposed amendments submitted by the General Assembly of the capital were based on a consensus and that the proposed amendments provided an opportunity for favorable cooperation. Chief Clerk Peter Szegvari expressed his own view by suggesting that in the interest of granting clear legal authority and to underscore the consensual basis of the law governing the capital city, adoption of the law be tied to the approval of a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly.

Gyorgy Krasso Reflects on Political Scene

91CH0337A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian No 2,
11 Jan 91 pp 68-69

[Interview with Gyorgy Krasso, head of the Hungarian October Party, by Gyorgy Kakuk in Krasso's home; date not given: "Always in Opposition"—first paragraph is TALLOZO introduction]

[Text] Krasso is Krasso. I wanted to have a short interview with the onetime correspondent about letters and criticisms sent to Radio Free Europe (in the following RFE). It failed. We rambled a bit in his somewhat surrealistically disorderly home, which also serves as party headquarters. This was perhaps where the inspiration came from. Perhaps this is how all sorts of political intimacies were touched upon. Therefore, an opinion follows, the opinion of an autonomous man.

[Kakuk] The news is that RFE looked through last year's letters sent in by listeners which question the absence of the voices of people who think differently. What is your opinion on such letters written by the listeners?

[Krasso] At the BBC, such letters were recorded in a book that was available to all staff members to read. I was a correspondent both at the BBC and RFE, that is why I was able to see those writings. One of the recurring themes was that, even then, listeners wanted to hear those with different opinions. What today's listeners may find lacking—I do not listen much to RFE anymore—is that RFE does not view the present situation critically enough. It does not get involved in any criticism of merit, nor does it evaluate the most important things.

But people with different opinions may also include silenced staff members within the radio station. Outstanding sociologist Zoltan Zsille, for example, who had his own opinion for a long time. He defected in the early 1980's. He had a very good program called "The World of Work," which was nonetheless abruptly discontinued in 1989. The reason for this was his interview with Hungarian Television in which he made the statement that RFE is not free at all, but censored. This was true at that time, and I think it is true today. I have evidence of this. When I was there, I stole a little card on which American managers informed the editors about what should not be discussed at the time. Such information was given daily, sometimes in an entirely grotesque form.

[Kakuk] What was the reason for these directives?

[Krasso] RFE was supported by the U.S. Congress and consequently, it had to follow the American line. Of course, the average American is not so stupid as not to want free information, but every nonprofit organization must serve those who provide the money.

[Kakuk] Was this a kind of lobbying?

[Krasso] Yes, that too, and now they are constantly trying to prove that RFE has not become dispensable. Despite this, I think that RFE will be disbanded in the end.

[Kakuk] Why did you give up your relations with RFE?

[Krasso] It happened during the turmoil surrounding Imre Nagy's burial. Originally, I was supposed to cover the burial, with the condition that I must refrain from

any public appearance in Hungary, then and subsequently. They even wanted me to sign a statement to that effect. I refused, of course.

[Kakuk] Let us clearly state that even those RFE programs, at the end of which the passage from the Declaration of Universal Human Rights concerning the freedom of the press is read each time, are censored.

[Krasso] Yes. This is sad, but it clearly shows the world's present situation. The listeners, who are now more critical than they were during the Kadar regime, would much rather listen to programs of a radio station that employs a tough stance in providing a realistic picture, thereby compensating for the one-sidedness of the Hungarian press.

[Kakuk] Do you think that RFE is sympathizing with the present MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] government, following its political line?

[Krasso] I think that it supports, and must support, the entire Hungarian political structure in general.

[Kakuk] Must???

[Krasso] The entire political system was planned by Americans and was created with their help. Former Ambassador Mark Palmer played the most important role in this development. The thing that led up to it was that the Americans always wanted to build their strategies on the internal opposition. I am not saying this in a pejorative sense, there was no agent activity of any kind, they merely provided political support for the opposition of that time. For instance, when I was placed under police supervision in 1984, the White House spokesman made a statement that although human rights fare better in Hungary than in the other East European countries, they are concerned about reprisals against Gyorgy Krasso because of an article. We felt that someone was keeping an eye on us and, if necessary, would protect us. The members of the so-called Democratic Opposition were probably also counting on this protection.

[Kakuk] You have put quite an emphasis on the word "so-called."

[Kakuk] Not accidentally. I think that it was neither democratic nor a real opposition. I also feel ashamed that we would call a group of a few hundred people a democratic opposition when the majority of society opposed the regime.

[Kakuk] Why was it not democratic?

[Krasso] Its main faction, which grouped around the BESZELO, functioned basically as a party, even ten years ago. It is known from *A Short History of the Soviet Union's Bolshevik Party* that the Communist Party was also organized around the journal ISKRA. The BESZELO group held closed-door editorial meetings every week. They talked not only about editorial issues but also about what they should or should not do in the movement. The BESZELO circle represented a very

decisive and conscious political line. It called itself the Democratic Opposition, which was Haraszti's idea. Their earlier name was Left Wing Opposition.

[Kakuk] But the fact that the members of this group ended up renouncing the left-wing ideals cannot be a problem, can it?

[Krasso] When someone is growing, changing, adapting, it can only be good. But adaptation has a degree which I consider bad, especially when it is not coupled with soul-searching and self-criticism. Write it down because it is left out most of the time and I often make the mistake of not talking about the Free Democrats' neophyte leaders when I criticize the SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats].

[Kakuk] Who are these neophytes?

[Krasso] Ivan Peto, Tolgyessy, to a small extent Balint Magyar and Imre Mecs who, although a 1956 convict, participated in the opposition only in dealing with issues of environmental protection. Now I see that these new people are beginning to squeeze the "veterans," people who made the greatest contributions to the movement, both earlier and recently, out of the leadership.

[Kakuk] Of whom are you thinking?

[Krasso] I am thinking of Janos Kis who, with his ingenious concept, formed the SZDSZ ten years ago. I am thinking of Ottilia Solt who created the SZETA [Fund for the Assistance of the Poor], or of Ferenc Koszeg, whom I should have mentioned much earlier, just like Janos Kenedi, Gyorgy Petri, or Balint Nagy. Well, several of these early leaders have completely withdrawn from political life. Those are the ones who are beginning to be squeezed out of the party leadership. Ottilia Solt was left out of the leadership. Koszeg was just ousted from the ranks of executives. This was particularly unjust for him because you must know that he was the one who "made" the SZDSZ as most of the others were in America in November 1988. I feel that the possibility of pushing these old leaders aside does exist.

[Kakuk] You mentioned Janos Kis' ingenuity. What was it?

[Krasso] His concept was to form a party and guilefully maneuver it as if it were standing on a purely idealistic ground without ever revealing this idealistic ground. At the time of BESZELO's foundation two currents already existed within the opposition. Now, in retrospect, they try to make it appear as if the line within the SZDSZ is between the liberal and the social (read: socialist) factions.

[Kakuk] Where did you belong within the opposition?

[Krasso] I belonged to the more radical line which criticized and rejected the fundamental dogmas of communist ideology. This group did not even have a leader because it was unable, and did not really want to have a partylike organization.

[Kakuk] Where did the MDF and their people of resistance come into the picture?

[Krasso] Before going into that, I must say that the SZDSZ is very close to me, that is why I watch it with so critical an eye. I never expected any earthshaking things from the MDF, and they proved me right. I am only sorry that they botched a great opportunity. The MDF grew out of the populist writers' movement which was always characterized by its willingness to make an alliance, even with the devil if necessary for the Magyar cause. In other words, they somehow got along with every regime. Imre Pozsgay was the midwife at their birth, the result of a process planned from above. Pozsgay was still convinced at that time that the change would be implemented by the MSZMP's [Hungarian Socialist Party] reform wing. But it was already evident that the state party could not be preserved in its present form, and that it had to find allies. The MDF became its ally. After a while it was not the dog that wagged its tail, but rather the tail that wagged the dog. Through its national, Christian, and other slogans, the MDF became much stronger than the state party or even the Democratic Opposition, which gave its name to the changes already ten years before. The first anticommunist voices within the MDF were the first signs of the MDF's real strength.

[Kakuk] This can be connected to the name Jozsef Antall....

[Krasso] Yes, I believe that a big change occurred after Zoltan Biro's fall, whose personality was too closely tied to Pozsgay. The party's onetime daredevil became only a burden. But I do not believe Antall was well liked. A few trustworthy people such as, Csurka, Csoori, or Lezsak made the MDF attractive in intellectual circles because they were the ones who were able to show some kind of resistance to the communist regime. I disagree with Csurka in many things, I am disgusted with some of his statements, but I respect him for relentlessly nurturing the spirit of 1956. Year after year, as each anniversary approached, he slipped something into one of his writings with which to commemorate the revolution.

[Kakuk] Since we are talking about Csurka, he constantly speaks of the freedom of the press and the control of the press. What is the real freedom of the press? Does freedom of the press exist today when the government has control over the electronic media? And why are those who are now in power, like Csurka, for instance, constantly threatening the press?

[Krasso] First, I would like to take issue with a subordinate clause. I do not think Csurka is in power, and neither is Csoori. The latter was almost ousted from the Writers Association because of a writing in an obscure paper. There were examples of such things in dictatorial regimes. Regarding Csurka's activity, he is viewed in the MDF as an anti-Semite, and this puts the party's international relations in a bad light. In order to get rid of this assumption, which we can also call a rumor, people with

some kind of Jewish connections were chosen to lead the MDF. This is good propaganda to prove that the MDF is not an anti-Semitic party.

The fact that the MDF is trying to gain control over the press through administrative measures is an understandable response. The press is under SZDSZ control, and this is what the MDF wants to stop through central control. The MDF is now paying the price for forgetting its election slogan and not putting all things in order.

If I am correct, not one single person was dismissed at the Radio. I am not an advocate of the B list, but there must be at least one person after forty years of dictatorship who is responsible for the Radio's Kadarist programs.

The freedom of the press is not really working. The Hungarian October Party is mostly ostracized by the press. Only our troublemaking is published, not our political views.

[Kakuk] One of the posters at the local elections raised the question: "What Will Happen Now?" In closing, I would like to ask you the same thing.

[Krasso] It is difficult to answer that. Everyone here was able to save his skin. No one was held accountable. For instance, when I was called in by the Ministry of Interior in 1983 to have them tell me why I could not get a passport even after decades had passed, I was received by a colonel who told me that he knew what I was doing, that he had read my writings with interest. Then, very cynically, he continued by saying that I was a sick man, and that automobile traffic was very heavy in the West, and an accident could easily happen to a man with such poor hearing. In other words, they were only trying to protect my health by not issuing a passport. It turned out later that this colonel was assigned to handle the 1956 cases. He now sits in parliament. Of course, this is only a little addition, one could go on until morning with such stories. You should ask instead what I do not expect.

[Kakuk] What do you not expect?

[Krasso] I continue not to expect freedom, equality, or brotherhood. That is, justice or solidarity.

Retired Police General on Weakened Police Force

91CH0377A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian
11 Jan 91 p unknown

[Interview with Dr. Lorinc Laposi, retired police major general and former chief of Homicide Division, on 23 December 1990 by Tibor Tamas; place not given; article is reprinted from KURIR 5 Jan 91 p unknown]

[Text] The ORFK [National Police Headquarters] press conference held on 23 December of last year, was also the swan song of Police Major General Dr. Lorinc Laposi, chief of criminal division of the National Police Headquarters.

Having turned 55, and after 34 years of service (of which 31 years were spent in public safety and homicide) he went into retirement. First of all, what prompted him to do so, and was it his own decision to part with his desk? Back in December, he evaded these questions. This time, however, in an exclusive interview with our paper, he reveals his true motives.

[Tamas] We already knew back then that the health reasons excuse, or simply saying that you have completed your years of service were a cover-up for the real reason....

[Laposi] I don't know the source of the rumor about my deteriorating state of health. Several years ago I did have a heart attack but I was neither hospitalized with it, nor have I had any after effects. I feel well. It is true that I have reached retirement age, but my bosses, Gyozo Szabo and Andras Turos have asked me to stay on. However, I have decided not to stay.

Why, you ask? Last spring, Mr. Turos was appointed commissioner, which signaled the beginning of a very healthy process. We have prepared a number of situation assessment analyses, weighing the possibilities of, and steps to be taken toward finding a way out of our problems. Vitally important statutory regulations have been drafted, and important personnel changes have been made. We have acknowledged, to a certain extent, the justified criticism leveled at us in the press, which, in my opinion, have been directed not against the rank-and-file policeman or detective, but against the party state's instrument of oppression. (It is true that many had blurred the line between crime fighting and state security, which was wrong.) Despite the attacks, we have supported the press and have come up with a system of providing them with a broad range of information, including press conferences in certain cases. In response to popular demand, we have also pushed for the return to the TV screen of a modernized version of the program "Blue Light." At the time professor Nemeskurty, president of Hungarian Television, agreed with our suggestion. In the meantime, someone complained that it was again Janos Dobos (who as the country's leading expert on protecting property had also been called back to the ORFK by Mr. Turos) and I who wanted to be the stars. I did not understand this backstabbing, since we had never demanded or pulled any strings to be put before the camera, nor did we ever mutter when we were on "Blue Light." No one who supports crime prevention and the police would resort to these kinds of attacks.

[Tamas] But I would think that at that time such innuendos still did not seriously hinder your reform efforts.

[Laposi] The Danube-gate scandal broke amidst our planning and preparations, which seriously undermined the position of the police, and particularly that of the intelligence section (which was under my direction). The possibility of employing operative methods ended. Even in parliament some have been questioning the propriety

of using clandestine means and methods. We should try to be more innovative instead, we have been told. How can "European" politicians say things like this when it is common knowledge that police forces everywhere around the world resort to such means, and when the criminals themselves employ clandestine methods?! Last year they also took away our legal options of expulsion and police surveillance. This presents great problems for us. We agreed with the decriminalization of vagrancy, but especially in the case of habitual recidivists, solitary confinement, the so-called *batyu* [bundle] should not have been eliminated until the courts could begin to look more carefully at who they had standing before them. Similarly, they had not thought through the broadening of the protection rights, the upgrading of jail facilities, and the new rules regulating preliminary custody, all of which add up to 300 million forints in surplus expenditures for the police without those expenses having been programmed into the budget. In other words, they have curtailed our powers, many of which are recognized to have a legitimate place in any constitutional state.

Then, after Andras Turos came Balazs Horvath, who stressed the need to strengthen the police by improving its technical capabilities, and especially by giving the force a 50-to-60-percent across-the-board pay increase and returning to the powers of which it had been divested. The only thing that has been accomplished to date since May of last year, however, was the separation of police and state security functions. Everything else has remained a promise. Moreover, the commissioner and deputy commissioner of the now independent ORFK have fallen to sixth and seventh place, respectively, in the Ministry of Interior's hierarchy of specialists, despite the fact that Andras Turos is our number one police expert. It seems that in setting up its own team of players, the present government may not have focused on putting qualified experts in certain positions. In summmary, as a result of all of this, last year's strong and dynamic steps have come to a halt, and the intentions expressed have never materialized. I find this most disturbing.

[Tamas] At the same time there has been a noticeable rise in antipolice sentiments and criminal statistics.

[Laposi] There are inherent contradictions in all of this, which if allowed to go unrecognized at the government level, or even worse, if viewed as concomitants of an ideal situation to be credited to a few insignificant measures, will come to tragedy. After all, the major problem confronting us today is no longer crime perpetrated by Hungarians, but rather the growing involvement by significant numbers of specialized and organized international criminals in domestic criminal activities, including Arab currency dealers, Turkish and Yugoslav people, weapons and drug smugglers, Romanian pickpockets and burglars, Bulgarian counterfeiters, Poles, Soviets...! Hungary is now a part of the Balkan trail. Criminals have begun to carve out their own territories in our country.

Without "visible means of support" our officers are unable to stand up to such an onslaught. Under these circumstances I cannot look my people in the eye, or face myself in the mirror, and offer them nothing more than empty phrases.

[Tamas] Isn't this running away while the going is getting tough?

[Laposi] This thought has often crossed my mind, and I still have not sorted it all out. Crime fighting continues to be close to my heart. If the circumstances were different...

[Tamas] For decades, you have been in a position of leadership. To what extent do you feel responsible for having gotten to the point where the police today are facing daily operational problems?

[Laposi] I feel that I have served honorably thus far. For 31 years, I have headed the homicide division which, without exaggeration, has employed the creme de la creme of our detectives. We have never been directly affected by politics. In 34 years, I have not once received a call instructing me to "cover up" a case. Thanks to our outstanding staff, we never used to have more than one to three unsolved cases in a year. We even ended some years with a perfect record. But because of the changed circumstances in 1989 we had to file nine, and last year more than 20 cases remained unsolved. For a whole year I have worked, first as head of the criminal department and after January of last year as chief of the criminal section, to restore our prestige and regain our lost powers. On countless occasions, my colleagues and I have warned the people concerned, and I have personally submitted one petition after another, calling attention to what was going on in the police force and in the world of crime, but to no avail. I have found myself in an impossible and helpless situation, and there is nothing that I can do....

You cannot turn overworked people into European-quality, refined police officers. We are five years off in terms of average age.... Similarly untenable is the fact that within the top echelon of the Ministry of Interior criminal experts have become relegated to the background. This is something I cannot accept.

[Tamas] I see that one of the recurring themes in your list of reasons has been incompetence. But there are those who say the same thing about you, claiming that you have become detached from reality, and that you enjoy special privileges.

[Laposi] Not only has the flow of ideas, plans, and initiatives tapered off or come to a halt, but internal fighting for positions has become predominant. During the past year, people at our various police agencies have been constantly reporting on one another. This is particularly true of those with average or even lesser abilities. Having joined up with one of the political parties, they immediately became candidates for commissioner, slandering and berating their colleagues left and right. It

would be interesting to look into how many people on the force belong to various parties, and to see what advantages they enjoy as a result of their affiliation. They say that the police force is supposed to be free of politics!

[Tamas] Is it also not possible for a recently appointed, but otherwise well-suited and qualified police chief and deputy to fall by the wayside in the upcoming competition, and for the four or five ready-to-be-replaced leaders to remain intact in their positions?

[Laposi] Anything is possible. But I do find it difficult to understand the motivation behind the attacks on Andras Turos. It is practically impossible to know anymore what can be said to whom because the information may be leaked to the outside within two minutes.... Indeed we have received more and more reports from criminals about the corruptibility of certain officers. Money and material wealth are powerful instruments of temptation that may sway someone who is forced to stretch every penny to make ends meet....

As for the allegation about me enjoying special privileges, all I can tell you is that I have never received a promotion out of turn. However, I was demoted once for a whole year for singing the Sekler anthem. I was held responsible for something that was not even in the criminal code. Although I was cleared by the office of the chief prosecutor in just one day, the fact remains that they had set out to vilify a commander. I was once accused of forcible rape using a firearm, even though I have never been known as the violent type. The woman later admitted that she had picked me as the perpetrator from a collage of graduation photos. I might also add that at the time of the crime I was at the theater. At a little over thirty years of age, my career could have come to an abrupt end.

As far as my not being in touch with reality, I would just simply point out that in 31 years I was involved in the investigation of every priority murder case. This is what I do well. You need only to ask the counties what they think of my work. I feel that I am one of those who can leave with his head raised high. Besides, I am not overly concerned about who says what about me. On the other hand, they are welcome to pull out any of my reports or year-end summaries to look at some of the things that I have uncovered or proposed. I have made it clear, for example, that internal reorganization was merely a magic word which real police experts never take seriously because they solve nothing, and because today's staffing levels are still determined on the basis of 1962 conditions. I have tried for 20 years to convince others to give us more people....

[Tamas] Still, are you pessimistic or optimistic about the future of the Hungarian police?

[Laposi] I am optimistic. I hope that the government will succeed in resolving our (mostly) economic problems because that will also improve the situation of our police force.

[Tamas] What do you plan to do in your retirement years? Are you going to become a consultant for some business firm?

[Laposi] I have received countless offers. But I have not made any firm decisions.

New Publications Spark Media Controversy

Press Law Draft Criticized

91CH0333A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 11 Jan 91 p unknown

[Interview with Publicity Club executive Endre Babus by Balazs Stepan; place and date not given: "It Is Better With No Bill; A Perilous Press Bill"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] The Ministry of Justice has completed a new version of the press law. Experts say that the bill is unacceptable in its present form because there are several points which cause concern. Publicity Club executive Endre Babus thinks that having no press law is still better than the present bill.

[Stepan] Is there a need for a separate press law? If freedom of the press and prohibition of censure are declared in the constitution, then any subsequent regulation is either redundant or is a limitation....

[Babus] For quite a while I was in the minority on the Publicity Club's executive board in representing the view that a law, offering adequate guarantees, even for the civilian public, would be justified. But the basis of such a statute should be the same as that of Hungarian law at the turn of the century: "Freedom is the lifeblood of the press." The press law's regulations have been divided into six or eight statutes or decrees, making it practically impossible to view them as a whole. Instead, we would need one single thematic code. At least half a dozen all-encompassing bills were drafted during the Grosz and Nemeth administrations, but they have many similarities with the present draft in that they are unsuitable as liberal regulations. The press, as one of the chief guarantees of "public freedom," must be left alone after establishing fair rules of the game. But instead of precisely defining the freedom of the press, the draft wants to eliminate even the existing guarantees of that freedom.

Prosecutor Contra Press

[Stepan] What kinds of traps are hidden in the draft?

[Babus] They also want to modify the constitution at the time of passing the bill. The basic law, while it would prohibit censure in one paragraph, would create the possibility for immediate government intervention in another. It would be declared in the modified constitution that exercising the freedom of the press cannot involve any criminal act. However, this would be a mere tautology, duplicating the decrees of criminal law. It

would set up a trap for the press through an additional clause, declaring that the press may not violate personal rights. In comparing the draft of the constitution's modification with Paragraph 16 of the press bill, the danger becomes apparent. According to the press bill, the prosecutor may suspend or prohibit the distribution of a paper for three days if an article violates any restriction set in the constitution. His right would be based solely on his spur-of-the-moment assumption that the paper in question indeed violated someone's personal rights or presumably was involved in an act of crime, such as, allegedly made defamatory statements. But if a case of corruption is exposed in a report, the latter will evidently damage the reputation of the person involved. When, for instance, the press wrote on the parliament's button affair—the one when Csaba Hamori allegedly also voted in someone else's name in the parliament—the reports could have even been considered libels, a reason for the prosecutor to arbitrarily ban the paper's distribution. Thus, the inherent danger in the prosecutor's arbitrary power is the primary reason for me to state that this bill is the most brutal attack of recent years against the freedom of the press. Still, the press was not pampered by the government of democratic transition either. It was the Nemeth cabinet that last year introduced the press penalty, a non-asset-related indemnity up to 500,000 forints, strictly limited to papers. My assumption is that the prime minister was trying to mitigate a few parties' animosity against the press. According to the present regulations, if an offensive statement which allegedly violates personal rights is heard at a general meeting, the speaker cannot be held morally liable but the newspaper that published the statement can, ad absurdum, be held liable for non-asset-related indemnity or in plain language, consolation money. I cannot find any other explanation for this peculiar discrimination other than the former government's attempt to limit the freedom of communication because of pressure from certain parties or politicians.

[Stepan] What is it that the press law must inevitably regulate?

[Babus] The emergence of great press monopolies must be hindered at all cost. The present bill is the first one that concretely attempts to curb the excessive concentration of capital. Its alternative proposals are to be considered, for they may hinder giant monopolies stifling the press.

Better Without It

[Stepan] In what way is it attempted in the bill to regulate the editors' legal liability?

[Babus] The bill's objective is to set matters straight according to certain principles, but the concept worked out by the Ministry of Justice would only serve the purpose of keeping a tight hand over, and even intimidating the editors. The press law recognizes basically two models of liability. In collective liability, the author, the column editor, the readers editor, and the editor in chief

are jointly liable for an article that has been found by the court to violate any rights. Thus, it puts pressure on the editors' hierarchy as a whole. The other model is a system of gradual liability. In it, it is the author who is first and foremost liable for the article. If, for some reason, it is impossible to determine his identity, then it is the editor in chief who may have to stand in court. If for some reason this is also impossible, then the publisher and, finally, the printer may be held legally liable. This localizes liability and does not put pressure on the editors and publishers as a whole, and this is why I consider the latter acceptable. Let me note that the 1914 press law was also based on gradual liability. Incidentally, I fail to understand why the government, which has such a predilection for declaring the necessity of reviving progressive Hungarian legal traditions, does not apply this heritage.

[Stepan] Is the bill suitable for parliamentary debate?

[Babus] The passing of both the constitution's modification and the bill requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority which hopefully provides an adequate guarantee for preserving the freedom of the press. The bill in question is flawed to the extent that I have no choice but to agree with experts and colleagues who think that it would be better if no separate press law existed at all. Presently, it seems that there two kinds of important legal interests that are competing with each other. Freedom of the press on the one hand, and the interest of preserving individual rights on the other. For the latter's unlimited implementation, those who drafted the bill want to limit the former.

[Stepan] What do you think is missing from the bill?

[Babus] A debate has been going on for a long time now among lawyers and journalists whether a newspaper security, the so-called security deposit, should be introduced. My view is that in the case of political daily or even weekly papers, we should consider the reinstitution of security for the protection of both society and the journalists, probably does not put me in the majority in my own profession. The money set aside for compensation or penalties is a guarantee for rapid reparation of the aggrieved party. The press law of the turn of the century also required that the paper's security deposit be replenished to the level prescribed by the statute within 15 days after the payment of possible compensations. Failure to do so resulted in a ban on publishing any politically oriented article until the deposit's replenishment. Incidentally, the security deposit may also protect the journalists, because if one of them would be sentenced to pay a fine and could not, he or she would have to go to prison to serve a term. This unpleasant incident could be avoided in some cases if a security deposit existed because the publisher could cover the fine from this deposit. It is another question whether the editors would afterwards deduct the fine from the journalist's pay. In

summary, I can say that it would not be good if the new press law was made in the spirit of the bill.

TV President's Demands Debated

91CH0333B Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 2 Jan 91 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Miklos Haraszti, Ferenc Kulin, Denes Csengey, and Matyas Eorsi by Mihaly Enyedi Nagy; place and date not given—first paragraph is PESTI HIRLAP introduction]

[Text]

Hankiss Versus Parliament

The Saturday speech of the president of Hungarian Television stirred up a lot of anger during the last three days and, moreover, it seems that even at this price he failed to influence the decisionmakers. In the following we present the views of a few members of parliament because what they have to say goes beyond the figures. We collected these statements in the afternoon of the last day of the debate on the budget.

[Haraszti] If only a single public-service program remains, it will replicate the monopolies which in turn will "invite" the political establishment. One-party states built single-program television networks in Europe. In other places, television started with two channels to begin with.

Regarding the question of the resignation of Elemer Hankiss, the way I recall, the cultural committee supported him and I do not see why we should deviate from that. In other words, he should give very good reasons for such a step.

[Nagy] We are now in the period before the decision but after the cultural committee's meeting. What was in this meeting?

[Haraszti] Csengey said, let us not give a single penny to the TV network because Hankiss delivered such an ugly speech. Kulin would like to give as much as possible, and the committee supported the 3-billion version, but Csurka voted against it.

Inexact or Erroneous Data

[Kulin] I have not seen the Hankiss speech, so I cannot say anything about it. I do not see anything wrong with the fact that it was aired because I consider this statement a step taken in the defense of TV viewers, and I do not believe that it was an act of self-defense on the part of the TV staff.

[Nagy] We know not only that there is a debate even within the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] on the amount of the subsidy, but also that originally you proposed 5 billion.

[Kulin] A national and public-service television cannot be built with only one channel. We must expect a lot from a national TV, from news to public education, from

instruction to entertainment, plus at least one alternative. National television network must provide the possibility of choice within its own value system. The thousand-year-old experience that culture needs patronage is also true of this modern medium. However, it is undeniable that some people think the TV network's new management has not proven to be trustworthy, therefore, granting large sums of money is not justified.

[Nagy] Was the cultural committee aware that the data supplied by the president of the television network were erroneous or inexact and that gross and net figures were mixed?

[Kulin] I cannot make an expert statement about this. As far as I was able to determine from the information obtained since the budget committee's suspicion, the possibility that the president's statement included inexact or erroneous data is not to be excluded, but the extent of their inexactness should not make the amount of TV subsidy disputable.

We are familiar with the plan of reorganization presented by the president of the television network but have not yet finished with our discussion. It is natural for the establishment, i.e., the cultural committee, to have a chance as well as a right to evaluate the plan, but I think that to cut the funds before starting the plan serves no purpose. It is to our credit that dismissals at the TV network take effect in six months instead of the end of 1991.

[Nagy] Will the budget be modified?

[Kulin] Almost certainly because, with a subsidy of one billion, either broadcast times must be shortened or the second channel, at least in part, must be sold.

No One Should Threaten

[Nagy] Elemer Hankiss practically handed in his resignation in case a subsidy of one billion forints would be authorized. Do they want to remove him and then have the money squeezed out for a new right-hand man?

[Csegey] Your question must be a New Year's Eve joke but it is true that Elemer Hankiss' letter and call to the nation went beyond what is admissible in a debate over the budget or in a democracy in general. Schools, hospitals, the police, and the military will also get less, but Elemer Hankiss did not leave any room for them on the screen to make any demands.

He abused the means entrusted to him. What if the police would have used spray and truncheons in demanding more money?

I have high respect for Elemer Hankiss but if he threatens too often to resign, we just might accept his resignation.

No one can threaten in the present situation to withdraw his efforts. An entire nation is now making alliances for

its survival, and everyone should accept sacrifices instead of presenting demands.

Much More Expensive Later

[Eorsi] I have not heard his speech, I have only read his letter addressed to us, but I was already familiar with the data that it presented. I think that in dealing with the burden of the budget as a whole, we are not assigning a proper priority to the case of national television. If we fail to save at least one of the channels, then it will take us many long years and many more sacrifices to rebuild what we now have. In order to avoid this, I will be the first one to support in two or three months the modification of the budget if necessary.

TV Journalists' Reports Suspended

91CH0333C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
30 Jan 91 p 4

[Report by A.F.Gy.: "Juszt, Franka—Silence"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Laszlo Juszt and Tibor Franka are banned from the programs of Hungarian Television between 30 January and 1 March.

This is what is in the letter which HET [Week] Editor in Chief Istvan G. Palfy received from TV president Elemer Hankiss on Tuesday, as the MTI correspondent learned from Executive Director Gabor Banyai. The letter was written in the wake of the two journalists' interview with Jozsef Torgyan. The reporter's insultingly aggressive demeanor, as well as a lack of professional preparedness brought discredit to both Jozsef Torgyan and the TV station, said Gabor Banyai of the reasons for the decision. The ban does not affect the offenders' employment status because there is no provision for that in the Labor Code, emphasized the executive director.

We also learned during our talk with Gabor Banyai that the program "Hirhatter" will be discontinued as of the end of February. Its Thursday evening slot will be filled with another program on domestic policy. The change was initiated by "Hirhatter" Editor Andras Feuer. (MTI)

* * *

Laszlo Juszt spoke yesterday in this regard; today Tibor Franka gives his opinion on the affair:

"It is possible that our report was indeed bad, although every new initiative is more likely to be bad than good the first time. Was it that we, the two reporters, 'did not connect,' as my colleague stated? I do not know. At any rate, I am glad that we did not connect, and the bad report is not the only reason. Juszt and I spent only about five minutes before we went on the air discussing what questions we should ask Mr. Torgyan. I would have preferred to inquire about the land and coalition issues, but Juszt's view was that Torgyan should be given the floor, the same way as he had done it earlier with

Romhanyi in the NAP-TV. We agreed in the end that both of us would raise whatever questions we wanted to.

"I had nine questions, and thus, I was prepared, but I could not even say a word in the first five minutes. What followed was not my style. The thought came to mind that, regardless of whether it was a live program or not, I should get up and leave the studio.

"There should be no misunderstanding, I do not consider myself a victim, because in the end I did stay and am as guilty as Juszti, but there are many things that I do not understand either. Hungarian Television had even broadcasted much stronger interviews in the past. For some reason the yardstick seems to be stricter in the case of the programs "Hirado" and "A Het." Finally, I do not understand why, and in whose name Mr. Hankiss apologized to Jozsef Torgyan."

Springer-Press Union Contract

91CH0333D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
10 Jan 91 p 5

[Unattributed article]

[Text] The Press Union and Axel Springer-Budapest Publishers Ltd. [AS-B] signed a collective contract on Wednesday in Budapest. This is the first labor agreement between a big international company and an interest group that represents the former's Hungarian employees.

Staff members of the seven county papers and publishers owned by Springer previously discussed the contract draft. The final document is in accordance with the norms generally accepted in Hungary. AS-B staff member Peter Nemes told an MTI reporter in reply to his inquiry that some practices in Hungary are not as good in certain areas (e.g., in wages) as in Germany but both parties strived to create the best conditions. The pay of journalists working for Hungarian Springer papers originates from two sources. In addition to their basic wages, they can count only on escalator pay for strictly defined tasks. The collective contract's implementation will be evaluated at the end of 1991 by the signatories (AS-B and the county papers' union secretaries), and that evaluation may serve as the basis for possible modifications. (MTI)

MDF Leaders Restart Weekly

91CH0333E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
10 Jan 91 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Pugnacious Anticommunist Paper—There Will Be a MAGYAR FORUM"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] (From our correspondents) A press conference was held yesterday morning at the Bem Square MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] headquarters about the MAGYAR FORUM, resuming publication as of January, and about the newest information on the tragic Salgotarjan fusillade on 8 December 1956.

"The MAGYAR FORUM that will be published again is not a party paper but as an independent paper on public life that reflects the spirit of MDF," said MDF national committee member Istvan Csurka. He added that the paper will subscribe not only to the Lakitelek spirit of MDF but to all factions of the party. Csurka told us that the primary reason for having to suspend the paper's publication last year was financial, but political and other factors also came into play. The MAGYAR FORUM's editors will also be involved in book publishing, working together with Puski Publishers, and its staff members will present evening programs on culture, politics, and literature throughout the country. Csurka emphasized that the MAGYAR FORUM is open to including other political forums as well. The paper's political hard line will not be lost and it will be a pugnacious anticommunist paper.

Deputy chairman Balazs Horvath presented [hitherto] unknown details of the Salgotarjan massacre, and requested that the journalists help find the perpetrators of a double murder. He recounted that communist thugs shot engineer Lajos Hargitai and technical translator Rudolf Hadady at close range and dumped their bodies into the Ipoly River during one of the days that followed the 8 December 1956 fusillade. Since the related documents were supposedly destroyed in 1961, the details of the event can be uncovered only through research. The journalists added and corrected several details of the event. Their comments revealed that several papers had already initiated a thorough investigation of the events.

This was followed by a press discussion. Sandor Csoori talked about the importance of Hungarian Culture Day. He said that according to history's testimony, an entire epoch can be lost from history if it does not create culture. Now that the establishment wants to gobble up everything, let 22 January be a tolling reminder in our lives that makes us aware of the importance of culture.

Social-Liberal Monthly Started

91CH0333F Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
12 Jan 91 p 9

[Interview with HIAN Y editor in chief Andras Kardos by Gyula Varsanyi; place and date not given: "The Missing HIAN Y"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] The face of young Anna Kethly looks out from HIAN Y's front cover. The journal, a former biweekly turned monthly periodical which identifies itself as being social-liberal, has dedicated its December issue to the yet unpublished correspondence of the noted social democratic politician. Publishing this issue also confirmed the November promise of Editor in Chief Andras Kardos, that the journal will not fold. "Did you solve your financial problems?" we asked.

[Kardos] They are not yet resolved, but we are trying to get some support from various foundations. We would like to stabilize our situation and return to biweekly publication.

[Varsanyi] Your readers would perhaps accept the HIANY as a monthly periodical.

[Kardos] We think that reaching our readers every two weeks better suits the journal's profile. When the illegal periodical BESZELO became a legal weekly after its 27th issue, we wanted to continue its earlier genre of social and political essays which was transplanted from the BESZELO because it was a biweekly. Thus, we are not dealing either with actual political events or with general analyses. With our articles we would like to contribute to the interpretation of events and happenings. A monthly appearance would be too scarce for this.

[Varsanyi] You implemented your above concept in a rather broad sense in the 21 issues that have appeared since December 1989.

[Kardos] Besides the "Hatter," we consider the "Multhiany" among our columns as very important; in it we publish the typed essays and studies of lasting value that appeared during the 1970's and 1980's as samizdat publications. We published the writing of Gyorgy Konrad, Miklos Tamas Gaspar's studies dealing with Magyars and questions of nationalism, or Gyorgy Petri's essay on nonviolence. From time to time we also published earlier writings that deal with current themes, for example, Gandhi's essay or Bela Hamvas' study on the problem of being outside of society. But I could also mention documents such as the lengthy interview with Peter Renyi which was a starting point for a serialized debate in MAGYAR NEMZET.

Besides Gyorgy Konrad and Miklos Tamas Gaspar, our regular contributors include philosopher Mihaly Vajda, sociologist Peter Gyorgy, politician Laszlo Toth Gy., and writer Zsolt Csalog. Unfortunately, I can mention sociologist Gabor Vagi only as a onetime contributor who had his own independent column in the journal until his death. We also published essays written by economist Zita Petsching Maria, Tibor Liska, and Janos Kornai.

[Varsanyi] The question arises, not only from this list but also from the journal's tone: What are your relations with the Alliance of Free Democrats?

[Kardos] We are not financially or organizationally affiliated with any party or political organization. At the same time, we do not hide the fact that, because of our self-definition as being social-liberal, most members of our staff and most of our published contributors are, in terms of their political leanings, closest to the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats].

[Varsanyi] May I ask that you introduce the members of your staff?

[Kardos] Economist Eva Bogner is the editor of our economic column, publicist Peter Grawatsch is the

editor of our political column, historian Vilmos Heiszler is the editor of our historical column, and esthetician Csaba Konczol is the editor of our cultural column. Our picture editor is Eva Kapitany, and our layout editor is Sandor Muranyi.

[Varsanyi] And what can you say about your readers?

[Kardos] The HIANY addresses the intellectual class. The expansion of our relations with our readers is made difficult by the same grave problems in distribution as those that are generally faced by the journal publishing industry. At present, the post office will accept 5,000 copies and unfortunately, few of these reach the regional areas. Even if they do, they are sold "under the counter," i.e., they are not displayed with the rest. Thus, most of the time, only those who are determined to find it will get it.

POLAND

Political Parties: List, Leadership, Programs

91EP0270A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
4 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Fan Forowicz: "Panorama of Political Parties"]

[Text] The Polish spectrum is not easy to define in a clear-cut manner. There are a dozen or so parties which are in a position to fight for seats in the parliament right now. We have more groups dreaming about parliamentary representation which are registered by the courts. There are already 42 entries in the register established by the Law on Political Parties dated 28 July 1990.

Therefore, we are offering a classification of these 42 parties into left, center-left, center-right, right, and so-called others.

We should stress that the proposed classification of parties is in principle a matter of convention and should not be treated as a verdict already issued and not subject to discussion. We proceeded from the attitude of the parties toward property and the mode of organizing citizens which is an imperfect [method] but the one that most people easily understand. This places parties who have a preference for the interests of the employees and the omnipresence of the state on the extreme left. It positions on the opposite pole parties of the right and liberal parties which subscribe to the principle "as little state as possible" and "the individual is the master of his fate."

Briefly about the parties not mentioned in this 'Panorama.' Undoubtedly, some of them have simply neglected to register with the courts. Therefore, it may be assumed that they will soon file appropriate petitions. We also know that a very significant group, the Center Accord, is refraining from registration until its national

congress is held. We do not rule out RZECZPOS-POLITA undertaking an attempt at systematization once again some time later, this time with the participation of these parties.

The Left

Union of Polish Communists "Proletariat" [ZKP "Proletariat"]

Leader: Jan Zielinski. The headquarters of the party authorities is in Sosnowiec. Party emblem: a red carnation.

The goal of the party is to restore the significance of socialism in Poland. The ZKP [Union of Polish Communists] "Proletariat" perceives itself as an heir to the noble idea which was to be translated into reality by the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] apparatus, but instead was "distorted and besmirched by it." (Footnote) (All wordings used in the descriptions are taken from the registration documents of the parties.) It is precisely for this reason that the members of the former PZPR have to pass through the qualifying sieve of the Permanent Statute Commission before their possible admission to the ZKP. In its political aspirations, the ZKP has given up violent and supraparliamentary methods. [The party was] registered on 20 August 1990 as No. 9.

Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]

Leaders: Aleksander Kwasniewski, Leszek Miller, Tomasz Nalecz. Party emblem: a symbol based on a rose with three petals—two red and one white and red.

The SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] considers Poland to be the supreme value, and considers the will of the people expressed through democratic, proportionate elections to be the only source of power. It associates the future of Poland with democratic socialism and an opening to the world. The party stresses that the country owes a lot of worthy achievements to the activities of the former PZPR. The party comes out in favor of a strong state, the rule of law and tolerance, and the development of self-government. The SdRP publishes the daily TRYBUNA and other publications. It was registered on 23 August 1990 as No. 5.

Movement of Working People [RLP]

Leaders: Jacek Kasprzyk, Ewa Spychalska, Pawel Gieorgica. Party emblem: the black letter L on a round red background.

The movement is supposed to express the political tendencies of the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement]. It considers work, property, and self-government to be the most significant values. The party demands counteracting the recession, restricting unemployment, and holding back the restoration of capitalism and dirt-cheap buyouts of state property. It favors a parliamentary system, rejecting the concept of a strong presidency. It was registered on 18 January 1991 as No. 43.

Polish Socialist Party [PPS]

Leaders: Jan Jozef Lipski, Stanislaw Kubica, Piotr Ikonowicz, Grzegorz Ilica, Wieslaw Kukla, Andrzej Malanowski.

The party is not associated with any definite system in its view of the world. Its goals are the independence of Poland, parliamentary democracy, and equal opportunities and development potential for all citizens. The PPS [Polish Socialist Party] emphasizes greatly the duty of the state to care for the poorest and to eliminate economic disproportions which separate various social strata. It also unifies two factions which were vocal until recently: the PPS-TKK [Provisional National Committee of the Polish Socialist Party] and the PPS-Democratic Revolution. ROBOTNIK is the organ of the party; it also puts out several other publications of regional significance. It was registered on 24 August as No. 13.

Reborn Polish Socialist Party [OPPS]

Leader: Edward Osobka-Morawski. Party emblem: three parallel arrows pointed to bottom left.

A small group whose program theses are built on the 110-year-old PPS traditions. As its leader maintains, it has existed continuously since July 1944. It supports a democratic system, pluralism, giving equal rights to the four economic sectors, and the development of cooperatives and self-government. It was registered on 4 January 1990 as No. 11.

The Left Center

Citizens Movement—Democratic Action [ROAD]

Leaders: Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Zbigniew Bujak, Henryk Wujec.

The ROAD [Citizens Movement—Democratic Action] was set up to counter the threat of a recession, social unrest, and extreme political attitudes. It strives for strong parliamentary democracy, political pluralism, and the development of self-government. It desires the rule of law which is the same for all regardless of their view of the world, religion, or background. In the economic sphere, it strives for a market economy. It was registered on 17 December 1990 as No. 34.

Polish Peasant Party [PSL]

Leaders: Roman Bartoszcze, Hanna Chorazyna, Jerzy Kaminski (honorary chairman), Roman Jegielinski, Jan Komornicki. Party emblem: green shamrock with four leaves.

The party sets the goal of reinforcing democracy, fighting for the appropriate social standing of the rural community, feeding the people, and protecting the natural environment. It proceeds from the experience of the peasant movement, including the traditions of the Mikolajczyk PSL in 1946. The party views the contemporary

interpretation of agrarianism and the social teachings of the [Catholic] Church as the foundations of its program. The PSL [Polish Peasant Party] publishes the weekly ZIELONY SZTANDAR, CODZIENNA GAZETA POLSKA (currently suspended), and the theoretical magazine WIES I PANSTWO. It was registered on 5 September 1990 as number 1.

Party for the Unification of Europe—National Center [SZE—CK]

Leaders: Bronislaw Pyc, chairman; Bronislaw Kaczynski; Zdzislaw Janowski. The authorities of the SZE-CK [Party of the Unification of Europe—National Center] is located in Zgorzelec.

The party wants to unite all those who, irrespective of their view of the world, recognize the unification of Europe to be an objective necessity and a guarantee of the development of Poland as a member country of the great European family. It propagates unification on the principle of equal rights. The program also contains ecological emphasis and slogans stressing the significance of respecting human dignity, combating unemployment, and so on. It was registered on 5 September 1990 as No. 2.

Polish Peasant Party [PSL]

Leader: Henryk Bak. Party emblem: green shamrock with four leaves.

The group refused to take part in the PSL Unity Congress on 5 May 1990, not wishing to have anything to do with members of the former ZSL [United Peasant Party]. The statute reads: "The party aims at organizing the peasant stratum for political, economic, educational, and cultural efforts." The party considers itself to be the only true continuator of the K. Mikolajczyk political line. It was registered in September 1990 as No. 3.

Individuals residing in Czesochowa and Radom Voivodships signed the list of members supporting the registration request.

Union of Free Cooperative Members [UWS]

Leader: Michal Sandowicz. Party emblem: rainbow over the letters UWS [Union of Free Cooperative Members].

The goal of the UWS is to build a social system in Poland using positive human experience and yearnings, in particular the accomplishments of the authentic cooperative movement. It was registered on 29 August 1990 as No. 7.

Independent and Sovereign Labor Party [NSPP]

Leader: Tadeusz Harasimowicz. The authorities of the party are headquartered in Gdansk-Sopot. Party emblem: crowned eagle, the letters NSPP [Independent and Sovereign Labor Party], on the rim—"In Service to the Motherland."

As stated in the registration request, the group strives to bring back the republic. In its program, it calls for bringing back the state emblem, the crowned eagle, the traditional name of the state, and so on. As can be seen, the initial NSPP demands have already been met. In its program, the party proceeds from the indications of public protest in the years 1956 through 1988 and the spirit of the encyclical "Laborem Exercens." It was registered on 12 September 1990 as No. 14.

Christian Labor Party [ChPP]

Leaders: Jozef Hermakowicz, Maciej M. Letowski, Henryk Rozpara.

The ChPP [Christian Labor Party] wishes to represent the middle class (craftsmen, entrepreneurs, the learned professions). It strives for the development of the personality of man, protection of the family, and a social market economy. It counteracts liberalism and the money fetish. It was registered 1 October 1990 as No. 18.

J. Pilsudski Party of Labor Legions [SLP]

Leader: Edward Wierzbicki. The party authorities are headquartered in Krakow.

The party wants to put state-creating [as published] and independence ideals into the practice of civic life by means of organizational, ideological, and political work, in keeping with the principles to which Marshal Jozef Pilsudski subscribed. Former PZPR members and employees of the Security Service cannot be members of the SLP [Party of Labor Legions]. It was registered on 30 November 1990 as No. 24.

Universal Party of the Slavs and Allied Peoples

Leader: Kazimierz Abramski. Location of party authorities: Gdansk-Oliwa. Party emblem: crowned eagle with head turned to the right.

This universal, supraclass party wants to unify society on the principle of solidarity. It strives to bring individuals and peoples closer together until a new superstructure, a union of peoples, is created. It does not renounce accepting the burden of power in Poland. It accedes to the Socialist International. It was registered on 20 November 1990 as No. 29.

Polish National Commonwealth—Polish National Party

Leader: Boleslaw Tejkowski. Party emblem: crowned white eagle against the background of the white and red "Air Force"-style checkerboard.

A small group tied to the Union of National Commonwealth set up in Krakow in 1955. Strives for the complete freedom of Poland. Opposes dangers [embodied in] the construction of a common European house. Publishes MYSL NARODOWA POLSKI. It was registered on 12 December 1990 as No. 45.

Democratic Union

Leaders: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Piotr Nowina-Konopka.

The party sets the goal of carrying on the proven and accepted policy directions of the T. Mazowiecki government. It builds its structure on the basis of the ROAD and the Forum of the Democratic Right [FDP], counting also on the consolidation of the so-called middle-of-the-road people. It was registered on 25 December 1990 as No. 39.

The Center Right**Democratic Party [SD]**

Leaders: Jan Janowski, Mieczysław Jakubowski, Aleksander Mackiewicz, Tadeusz Rymszewicz, Krzysztof Zareba, Jerzy Robert Nowak. Party emblem: stylized, crowned white eagle against a blue background.

Polish and European humanism, liberalism, the trends of socialist philosophy, and the Christian-social idea are the source of political thought and tactic of the party. The SD [Democratic Party] was set up in Lwow in 1937; the constituent congress was held in Warsaw in 1939. For decades, the party has invariably favored private economy and market mechanisms. It has also tried to express the interests of the intelligentsia. It publishes the daily KURIER POLSKI and several other periodicals. It was registered on 30 August 1990 as No. 8.

Polish Democratic Center [PCD]

Leader: Ryszard Lewandowski. Headquarters of the authorities: Lodz.

The party intends to unify people holding centrist views. It strives for democracy in all of its manifestations and in all spheres of life. It was registered on 6 November 1990 as No. 25.

Christian-Democratic Labor Party [ChDSP]

Leaders: Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki, Kazimierz Switon.

The party is resuming operation after several decades of suspension. It emphasizes in its program the slogans of democracy, pluralism, privatization of state property, and employee joint-stock ownership. It sees as foremost the models of patriotism, justice, mutual help, and the conviction that the social teachings of the [Catholic] Church are correct. The party publishes GAZETA KONGRESOWA. It was registered on 3 September 1990 as No. 10.

National Party [SN]

Leaders: Bronislaw Ekert, Aleksander Czajka, Stefan Jastrzebski, Adam Krajewski, Edward Mastej. Party emblem: the little sword of [Boleslaw] the Valiant with a white and red band wrapped around it three times.

The party lives by the 1935 statute, but stresses the continuity of party tradition dating back to 1928. It

operates in the political forum as a supraclass movement. It strives for the takeover by the Polish people of all matters of the state and the individual. Their goals are the development of the forces of the people, sovereignty, and the internal order in Poland. They are guided by the motto of Roman Dmowski: "I am a Pole...and therefore I have Polish duties." The SN [National Party] publishes the National Weekly OJCZYŻNA. It was registered on 21 August 1990 as No. 4.

Christian National Union [ZChN]

Leaders: Wieslaw Chrzanowski, Marek Jurek, Jan Lopuszanski, Andrzej Tymowski.

The ZChN [Christian National Union] strives to consolidate forces in order to guarantee the independence of the Polish state and sovereignty of the people. It wants to ensure for all residents respect for freedom, personal dignity, equality, and welfare. The party opposes both communist collectivism and liberal individualism. It cherishes a commonwealth of citizens which brings about a sense of being rooted in the Motherland. It was registered on 4 December 1990 as No. 32.

Christian Democracy [ChD]

Leaders: Kazimierz Barczyk, Zbigniew Forczyk, Marek Cholewka. Headquarters of the party authorities: Krakow. Party emblem: fish with the inscription CHD [Christian Democracy].

The party was formed in 1990 on the initiative of the creative arts, religious, and academic communities. It preaches the principles of truth, common good, and solidarity. It associates security in Europe with the demand for the simultaneous unification of Poland with the EEC and unification of Germany. It wants to achieve the complete restructuring of the economy, reprivatization, a market system, and complete self-sufficiency in food supply, as well as the restoration of the position of Poland as an exporter of surplus foodstuffs later in the future. It was registered on 11 December 1990 as No. 36.

Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN]

Leaders: Leszek Robert Moczulski, Krzysztof Krol. Party emblem: crowned white eagle on a round red background, the symbol of "Fighting Poland," and the slogan "Freedom and Independence" across the chest of the eagle.

The party strives to build an independent, free, and just Poland based on full respect for human and civil rights and a democratic system of power. In public life, the party uses only equitable legal methods suitable for reality. It continues the political trend of Jozef Pilsudski. The party has been active in opposition since 1990 [as published]. It publishes the weekly OPINIA and a dozen or so regional periodicals. It was registered on 21 August 1990 as No. 6.

Polish Republican Club [PKR]

Leader: Janusz Malczewski. Headquarters of the party: Zarki-Letnisko, Czestochowa Voivodship. Party emblem: an arrangement of portraits of Boleslaw the Valiant, Kazimierz the Great, and Jozef Pilsudski.

[The party] "fights for the genuine freedom and independence of the Polish People and State." The PKR [Polish Republican Club] was created in response to external threats (among other things, the reunification of Germany) and domestic threats (protracted political and economic manipulations, etc). Among other things, the party demands that the former nomenklatura be isolated from matters of culture and education. It was registered on 2 October 1990 as No. 15.

Solidarity Christian Democratic Union [UChDS]

Leader: Bogdan Lau. Headquarters of party authorities: Slupsk. Party emblem: white dove with a crucifix in the background.

Propagates "accord between all Christians and other people of good will for the sake of the unification of Europe, defense of spiritual values, peace, and the Motherland." It was registered on 12 October 1990 as No. 17.

Christian Democratic Party "Unification" [ChDS "Z"]

Leaders: Janusz Zablocki, Ryszard Bender, Zygmunt Drozdek, Tadeusz Zembrzusi.

The party seeks a democratic state system based on the system of Christian values. It takes into account Polish cultural and political traditions. In the economic sphere, the party comes out in favor of a social market economy. The ChDS [Christian Democratic Party] strives to unite various Christian initiatives and trends in a single, strong Christian Democratic Party. It was registered on 12 November 1990 as No. 26.

Republican Party [PR]

Leaders: Jan Franczyk, Wieslaw Penc, Jozef Paluch, Maciej Roborzynski. Headquarters of party authorities: Krakow.

One of the few parties which may boast the fulfillment of most of their postulates. Among other things, it sought a two-chamber parliament, inclusion of the mission of the London Government in the tradition of the Third Republic, and free registration of parties. The following demands are still topical: a constitution adopted by a parliament created by free elections, the withdrawal of Poland from the Warsaw Treaty, and so on. It was registered on 14 November 1990 as No. 28.

Movement of Free Democrats [RWD]

Leaders: Karol Glogowski, Adam Piesniar, Jan Gluszek. Headquarters of RWD [Movement of Free Democrats] authorities: Wroclaw.

The party favors parliamentary democracy, powerful self-government, and equal rights for all forms of property. While appreciating the accomplishments of the People's Republic of Poland, it rejects terror used during this period and other mistakes made by the authorities. It builds on the traditions of the 1956 Union of Free Democrats and ROPCiO [Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights]. It was registered on 31 November 1990 as No. 31.

National Democracy [ND]

Leader: Zbigniew St. Jadacki. Emblem: the stylized upturned letter Z outlining the contours of the letters ND.

Desires to rebuild an independent, sovereign, and civic state of the Polish people. Sees "transformation of the postcommunist bureaucratic statehood into a statehood based on the principles of Latin civilization." It was registered on 20 December 1990 as No. 38.

Liberal-Democratic Action [ALD]

Leader: Tomasz Ankowiak. Headquarters of ALD [Liberal-Democratic Action] authorities: Lodz.

The ALD sees its goal as influencing the policy of state by creating economic rights and subsequently by facilitating the exercise of these rights in the political, economic, social, and cultural sphere. It was registered on 11 January 1991 as No. 42.

The Right

Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD]

Leaders: Janusz Lewandowski, Andrzej Arendarski, Jan K. Bielecki, Andrzej Machalski, Donald Tusk.

The party was started in the Tri-Cities [Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot]. The party favors a pluralistic political system and a market economy, with interference by the state reduced to a minimum. Therefore, one receives complete freedom, and at the same time responsibility for his status. The KLD [Liberal-Democratic Congress] was registered on 9 October 1990 as No. 20.

Forum of the Democratic Right [FPD]

Leaders: Aleksander Hall, Kazimierz Ujazdowski, Michal Chalonski.

Seeks a rule-of-law state which implements the concept of assistance. This means restricting the state to only the functions which cannot be taken over by other institutions or citizens. The FPD [Forum of the Democratic Right] recognizes the principle of evolutionary change. A free market and respect for private property are considered to be the foundation of the Polish economy. It was registered on 24 November 1990 as No. 30.

Conservative-Liberal Party [KLP] "Union for Real Politics"

Leader: Janusz Korwin-Mikke. Party emblem: a two-armed scale, a seagull on the left scale pan and a diamond on the right scale pan.

Strives to restore the significance of the basic values of Latin culture and civilization and restore the influence of the citizens on the authorities; seeks the separation of Church and state. Demands that the legislative functions of the parliament be restricted in favor of increasing the role of local legislation. Publishes the periodical STANCZYK. It was registered on 6 December 1990 as No. 33.

Conservative-Liberal Party [PKL] "Union for Real Politics"

Leaders: Aleksander Jedraszczyk, Lech Wisniewski, Slawomir Jaruga.

A party of proponents of a conservative-liberal line distancing themselves from the Conservative-Liberal Party "Union for Real Politics" of Janusz Korwin-Mikke. The splinter group formed in late August-early September of last year. It was registered as No. 19.

National-Liberal Movement

Leader: Jaroslaw Z. Szymanski. Headquarters of party authorities: Lodz. Party emblem: eagle with an open crown with scales and a lightning bolt.

The party objects to the Polish issue being part of a larger entity. It says that this is "the one and self-contained issue." It subordinates the national interest to the norms of morals and selection of individuals. It affirms the use of evolutionary methods opposing the revolutionary aspirations of the left. It was registered on 13 December 1990 as No. 37.

"Szczerbiec" National Party

Leaders: Marian Baranski, Mirosław Szczepan, Stefan Hilary. Party emblem: the little sword of [Boleslaw] the Valiant and a white crowned eagle with a cross.

The objective of the "Szczerbiec" National Party is to secure the comprehensive development of the forces of the Polish people and the might of the state. Individuals with a Polish ethnic background, Christian religion, and impeccable honor are admitted as members. It was registered on 15 November 1990 as No. 27.

National Front

Leader: Marek Lazniowski. Headquarters of the party: Zgorzelec. Party emblem: the Rodlo [symbol of the interwar Union of Poles in Germany, portrays the Vistula River with Krakow as the cultural center of Poland] sign on a sword within a wreath of oak leaves.

The Leader of the Front, who listens to the Supreme Command, holds power for life. His goal is to lead Poland out of the crisis, creating an economic, industrial,

and military power, ensuring welfare. It was registered on 19 October 1990 as No. 23.

Others**Polish Conservative Party [PPK]**

Leaders: Zbigniew Witek, Mariusz Siwecki. Headquarters of the party authorities: Poznan.

The goal of the PPK [Polish Conservative Party] is to facilitate the use of the capital and skills of the British in Poland. This will facilitate starting up the Polish economy and will create more favorable conditions for confronting the German element. It was registered on 9 October 1990 as No. 21.

Belorussian Democratic Union [BZD]

Leaders: Sokrat Janowicz, Wiktor Stachwiuk, Mikolaj Aleksiejuk. Headquarters of party authorities: Bialystok.

[The party] considers strengthening the identity of the Belorussian People of the Republic of Poland and the defense of its cultural, religious, and ethnic sovereignty to be its supreme duty. It seeks to develop the region populated by the Belorussian minority. The party does not organize its own structures, does not issue membership cards, etc. Membership is obtained by stating one's will and doing specific work on behalf of the BZD [Belorussian Democratic Union]. It was registered on 24 January 1991 as No. 41.

Polish Green Party [PPZ]

Party emblem: the sun on a green background.

This is a faction of the Polish Green Party created in Krakow in December 1988 whose so-called spokesmen are Dr. Zygmunt Fura (Krakow), Wieslaw Kossakowski (Plock), and Stanislaw Kubarski (Szklarska Poreba). Janusz Bryczkowski from Olsztyn is the leader of the registered, dissident PPZ [Polish Green Party].

Green Union

Leader: Jan A. Prochowski. Headquarters of party authorities: Bialogard, Koszalin Voivodship. Party emblem: a green leaf in a white ellipse.

Development of ecological culture, tolerance, democracy, peace, and friendship are the goals of the Green Union. It was registered on 18 October as No. 16.

Polish Party of Friends of Beer [PPPP]

Leaders: Adam Halber and Janusz Rewinski.

In Paragraph 1 of its statute, the PPPP [Polish Party of Friends of Beer] declares that it seeks the development of a civic society in Poland. Pubs in which they plan to organize discussions and lectures will be party headquarters. One of the goals of the party is to promote the new

image of a consummate beer drinker as tolerant and trustworthy. It was registered on 28 December 1990 as No. 40.

Stelmachowski: Elections, Wages, Rural Strife

91EP0318A Warsaw *KONFRONTACJE in Polish No 2, Feb 91 pp 8-9*

[Interview with Andrzej Stelmachowski, president of the Senate of the Polish Republic, by Jerzy Papuga; place and date not given: "Interview With Andrzej Stelmachowski"]

[Text] [Papuga] Mr. Speaker, at present we are living within a political interval between two parts of the same symphony, that of Poland's emergence from communism. Even now, however, the outline of some issues that may become more distinct in the near future is emerging. Can we even now make a list of these issues?

[Stelmachowski] The presidential elections were an extremely interesting, but not necessarily encouraging test. That is to say, it turned out that, just as on [in the parliamentary elections on] 4 June 1989, when essentially we were dealing with a plebiscite which totally rejected the communist system of society, so in the presidential elections [in November 1990] we were dealing with the emergence of much stronger anti-Solidarity forces than we had conceived. Of course, these are extremely diverse and disunited forces, but it can be assumed that those who had voted for Tyminski wanted to express their desire to reject the unfolding of events. For just then there appeared an extremist individual [Tyminski] relatively unknown in Poland. If such a personality attracted so many votes, that of course signifies the manifestation of a certain stance reflecting the extent of public frustration. At the same time it turned out that Lech Walesa's political influence is still extremely great. As a result, his presidency as the ultimate outcome is no surprise. Nevertheless, the elections revealed the existence of such trends as an extremely weak political engagement of the public, a striking weakness of political parties, and, lastly, the quite substantial margin of uncertainty. Had we wanted to conduct elections today, they would be in the nature of a lottery; their outcome would be unclear. At the same time the Presidency turned out to wield considerable powers, meaning not just the powers vested in it by the Constitution, considering that these remained the same as when General Jaruzelski was the president. As he became politically weakened, he largely failed to avail himself of these powers. Consequently, it can be said that prior to Walesa's election the principal power center was the government; not because it rested on a broad social base of support, for the elections demonstrated that it was a thoroughly weak base, but because there had been no sufficiently strong alternate power center. And had it not been for the conflict between Premier Mazowiecki and the current president Lech Walesa, it is likely that this situation would have persisted for some time yet. But

once push came to shove, it turned out that the government rested on a weak base of support and, as a consequence, the previous cabinet was dismissed.

[Papuga] But what would you conclude from this as applying to the present situation?

[Stelmachowski] That it is paradoxical. In this country political differentiation and organization is very weak, and hence also the parliament is weak. The Sejm is still burdened by the stigma of unrepresentativeness and linkage to the former [communist] forces owing to the roundtable contract. As for the Senate, sure, it does exist and exert some influence, but it was established as, so to speak, a random consequence of a political accident, that is, a consequence of the anticommunist plebiscite. Hence the crushing numerical predominance of Solidarity [senators] does not correspond to the actual situation. Against this background and considering the relative weakness of the government—essentially the government does not reflect the actual alignment of the political forces—it is the president who is triumphant. One can then ask, who is standing behind this government?

[Papuga] And the answer is one: the president.

[Stelmachowski] If the Sejm agreed to the appointment of such a government, that was only because it had the support of a strong president who is charismatic, enjoys considerable support of the electorate, and has the kind of background that makes him popular with the entire society! I would also consider important the fact that the emigre Polish government in London has now finally returned the insignia of power to Poland, which means our reconciliation with the Polish political emigres in the West. This causes the president's standing to be abnormally strong at the moment.

[Papuga] Mr. Speaker, the question of the [timing of the parliamentary] elections arises. Are there any options?

[Stelmachowski] There are two schools of thought. One says that we should wait until some political parties crystallize. And I do not mean one-couch parties whose entire membership can be accommodated on a single couch. It simply makes no sense for 130 political parties, including, say, the Party of the Friends of Beer, quite attractive otherwise, to exist. Therefore, let us wait. In view of this, Lech Walesa's intention to appoint a presidential council that would encompass all political centers, including—this being important—the groupings not represented in the parliament, as a kind of a prosthesis for the transition period, is understandable.

The other school of thought compares the situation to a swimming lesson. One cannot learn in theory how to swim; one has to enter the water and try. Parliamentary elections always represent a mobilization of political forces. In other words, earlier elections would accelerate an earlier crystallization of political forces. Yet, the substitute represented by the presidential council could delay this process. That is, rather, the elections should be held earlier.

A political decision must be taken, of course. But it has to be taken against the background of weak political parties and a hesitant parliament—no one likes to undercut the branch on which one sits—against the background of a government which is in practice almost entirely subordinated to the president because, in the absence of its support by broader political circles, it is the president's opinion that is decisive.

[Papuga] Let us then get a calendar and analyze the possible timing alternatives for the [upcoming parliamentary] elections.

[Stelmachowski] I believe that two periods come into consideration. Either May, because the attendant legislative work simply cannot be finalized before May. Please bear in mind that we still do not have an electoral law! June is out of question, because that is when the Holy Father will come to Poland by air, and that will not be a good time for elections. July and August are out, because they are vacation months. If we also are to have some minimum period of time for electoral campaigning, it seems that the end of October or beginning of November is the other good time for holding the elections. Our calculations must consider one more factor, namely, that if it is to be November then, given the four-year term of office of the parliament and the five-year term of office of the presidency, four years hence presidential and parliamentary elections would coincide. Is that good or bad? We have a choice between May and November. I am definitely against any further delays beyond November, as that would be simply deplorable. Let us also bear in mind the operation of external factors, the existence of a somewhat awkward situation in which Hungary already is a member of the Council of Europe but Poland is not, because it has not met the requirement of free elections. That will be a vexing problem. One other factor is that the Sejm is now working much less well than in the past; attendance by deputies and senators is shrinking not only at Sejm sessions but also at the sessions of Sejm committees.

[Papuga] Mr. Speaker, in your opinion, which socially engineered approach, acceleration or retardation, is advisable for a proper evolution of the map of social interests?

[Stelmachowski] What does it mean, the social interest, if you please? For in reality we are dealing with a number of group and political interests. I can only say that in my opinion earlier elections would be more advantageous to Solidarity as a movement. Why? Because for the time being we still are on the upswing owing to the new president and the new government, and hence also we still can count on broad social support. I may be thought pessimistic, but I believe that under this government waves of strikes or demonstrations reflecting social discontent will inevitably arise in a later period. Consequently, the holding of elections following these manifestations of social discontent would prove unfavorable to Solidarity. Were I the president, I would pick May as election time. But on the other hand you have to admit

that Lech Walesa has a fine nose for politics. We have no choice but to believe in his instincts. After all, this concerns the ability to predict the responses of the public. It would of course be ideal if political life were to crystallize and parties with strong social bases of support were to arise, and if the number of these parties were not too large. In that event, later elections would be much more preferable and can be only applauded. But I fear that obstacles may arise en route.

[Papuga] In speaking of dangers are you referring to issues relegated to the back burner during the presidential campaign, or do you perceive by now new foci of conflagration?

[Stelmachowski] I perceive chiefly dangers of the economic kind. The tax on wage increases is becoming increasingly unpopular, although a close scrutiny of the amended law indicates that the possibilities for maneuver in this respect are broader now. The question is thus whether these possibilities will be utilized, and whether they will provide some breathing room, some relief. If they are not utilized, unrest can be expected.

[Papuga] Do you think that the farmers will provide the detonator to this explosion?

[Stelmachowski] Perhaps!

[Papuga] Many political parties view themselves as rural or peasant parties. Would they be interested in the escalation of social tensions in the countryside so as to derive particular advantages from it?

[Stelmachowski] I believe not. Please bear in mind that political representation in the countryside is as divided as Solidarity and other social movements. Hence, I do not think that this precisely is the attitude of the farmers at present, but let us bear in mind that we do not know what will happen in the future. For the time being, farmers are among the segment of society that is suffering most. They do not accept the government's agricultural policy. Their political representation was painfully affected by being completely excluded from the formation of the new government. Hence, also, it represents potentially the most crystallized opposition to the government. For the time being the farmers are weak so long as they stand alone, but, you are right, they may be the detonator if they are joined by workers, or at least by workers from large industrial sectors. And as regards the working class, I believe that the detonator may be chiefly the transportation workers—employees of the postal service, the railroads, the urban public transit. Why? Because an industrial strike would not seem too promising considering that at a time when the government still has substantial financial reserves, which it does have, the strike of any industrial subsector can be broken by means of imports. That was how at one time Mrs. Thatcher broke the back of the extremely long and ultimately unsuccessful miners' strike in England.

[Papuga] Mrs. Prime Minister bought coal from Jaruzelski.

[Stelmachowski] Right. But a transportation strike would be a much more difficult problem. After all, you cannot replace domestic transportation with imports. That would certainly be a painful and possibly also effective strike. Hence the conclusion that if there are some major problems with transportation [employees], and they do exist, they should be resolved as soon as possible. But do you know why a paradoxical situation exists in transportation? The reason is that many categories of employees that are crucial to the operation of a given branch of transportation receive relatively low wages. For example, locomotive engineers are not paid much more than train conductors, and lack opportunities for augmenting their earnings. Thus, while a train conductor may earn as much as 5 million zlotys a month by selling tickets aboard trains, and in some cases pocketing the proceeds from some other undocumented services, a locomotive engineer is paid between 1.2 and 1.4 million zlotys a month. I am not surprised that the blood of locomotive engineers is boiling. After all their responsibilities and training are incomparably greater and more advanced than those of train conductors. A similarly paradoxical situation exists in aviation. We have 700 pilots, that is, an extremely small group, who are exceptionally ill-paid. Are you aware that a young pilot is paid less than 1 million zlotys a month. He can compensate for this low salary by tacking on per diems, but that is a pernicious practice because it delays flight schedules and was imposed in the belief that pilots can earn some money on the side while abroad. In reality, that is not so much. Because a pilot who flies somewhere abroad and then flies back in an hour has hardly any chance for making a big profit as a trader. And besides, he is not supposed to do so! These examples reveal a glaringly awry system of salaries paid to an economically crucial professional group. Groups of highly qualified specialists are unusually ill-paid. Pilots have told me that those who have been long working for Arabic airlines earn some \$6,000 monthly. Hah! These are two examples of anomalies in our wage system which should be immediately eliminated. If the Ministry of Finance continues to rigidly enforce the tax on wage increases, we shall soon be dealing with social unrest.

[Papuga] The peasant parties are only one of the elements in the opposition.

[Stelmachowski] What opposition? There exists the within-Solidarity opposition and the anti-Solidarity opposition. But as regards the farmers, the situation is more complex. Of a certainty they are opposed to the government. But it can hardly be told whether they are opposed to the president. Rather not. To a layman this is quite a mystery, but that is the situation. Even if we have a Walesa government, it is possible to be in the opposition to the government but not to Walesa himself. As for the opposition which had supported Tyminski, its situation is different; it is generally opposed to both the government and the president. And lastly there is the Democratic Union, which exemplifies the opposition within Solidarity. This means that on some highly

important issues the Solidarity movement is inclined to take a coherent stand on defending certain principles, but on other issues it is divided. The situation is different as regards the anti-Solidarity opposition, which would in general like to change the system of society which we are trying to build. Such is, more or less, this political landscape.

[Papuga] Let us for a while talk with you in your capacity as a major political figure. You had supported [former] Prime Minister Mazowiecki in the presidential elections, but at the same time you left some hope to the other candidate. In these difficult times in which politics is characterized by proneness to one-sided pronouncements, being credible to both sides takes great art.

[Stelmachowski] I am linked to [former] Prime Minister Mazowiecki by personal ties dating back to the Warsaw KIK [Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia], of which I was the chairman and he a deputy chairman. This played a great role in the presidential campaign. But it is a fact that I am not a member of the ROAD [Citizens Movement—Democratic Action], now called the Democratic Union, and that I remain a member of the leadership of the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP]. Briefly stating, I feel good as a member of the united Solidarity movement, and I do not feel as much a vocation for forming ties to the political parties arising nowadays. We shall see whether this means anything and to what will it lead. A politician should avoid two words, never and always. But between these two words there is a broad interval which can be filled in various ways. I am used to acting in teamwork with others. If my team decides to support me on some issue, that is good. If my team decides to support somebody else, I consider that binding on me. A personal career must be the outcome of some arrangement with the political forces. I admit that I feel better in the skin of a law professor than in that of a politician.

[Papuga] This also concerns your credibility.

[Stelmachowski] There are two people in Poland with whom my relations have assumed a particular shape. They are Primate Glemp and President Walesa. Close personal friendship can hardly be considered in these cases, but a considerable degree of mutual understanding without having to bandy words does exist among us. I, on my part, try not to impose myself on them too often. If I have a specific matter to discuss, I go to them in the knowledge that I will be given a hearing.

[Papuga] Thank you for the interview.

'Spring Agitation' Possible, Claim Peasants

91EP0290A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
4 Feb 91 pp 10-11

[Article by Krystyna Naszkowska: "The Specter of Mlawa: The Peasants Are Patient, but, in the Spring, Agitation May Prove Effective"]

[Text] The tone of speech of peasant activists has recently become sharper. Rural Solidarity had been scaring the Mazowiecki administration with "the hostile silence falling on the countryside." It had tried to extort desired minimum prices for farm products and broader farming subsidies.

It failed, and that is why so much was expected from the change in administration. However, that change did not result in attractive proposals and, worse even, the new administration dropped the portfolio of the minister of agriculture, which had been granted to Rural Solidarity by the Mazowiecki government. Hence, the warnings turned into threats.

Mazowiecki Did Not Understand and Neither Does Bielecki

There is the peril of a rural revolt, according to the Rural Solidarity Chairman Gabriel Janowski, who added that his union would head the peasant mutiny, in order to prevent uncontrolled violence.

"Peasants, you are right!" was how Janowski spoke in their language to the farmers of Zuromin who had recently demanded an increase in milk procurement prices. "The government does not understand the difficult lot of the peasant. Mazowiecki did not understand, and neither does Bielecki. As for Balcerowicz, he has the absurd idea that everything in life will be just like in the books."

It was only after the peasants blockaded the roads, according to Janowski, that "the authorities began to notice the problems of peasants" and granted funds for restructuring the dairy industry. Rural Solidarity will not again accept the same situation as a year ago when it had given Mazowiecki a blank check of confidence.

"But," the chairman added, "Rural Solidarity desires dialogue and is not keen to start protest demonstrations. It is the press, and especially GAZETA WYBORCZA, as well as radio and television that are keen to depict peasants as yokels and are by nature hostile to peasants. Television has always discriminated against Rural Solidarity and censured it. Comments by peasant activists continue to be cut, abridged, and broadcast in hours other than prime time."

Scythes at the Ready

Any moment now the peasants may get out their scythes, a Rural Solidarity activist claimed. He affirmed, "The peasants are not concerned with protecting their interests, for they are neither better than worse than the society in general; they are rather concerned with protecting agriculture as a whole, because food output is imperiled."

Another activist pointed to last November's assessment study by the Office for State Security and claimed that the countryside would revolt any moment now. Something has to be done. Just what, he does not know, but it

would be better to let Rural Solidarity have a voice in the government. It would fight for minimum [food] prices, customs duties on imported food, preferential credit for agriculture, and cheaper farm machinery and implements.

TYGODNIK ROLNIKOW SOLIDARNOSCI, the Rural Solidarity weekly, bluntly accused the authorities of destroying Polish agriculture, which is, according to the weekly, "potentially the best supplier of food for Soviet republics.... Europe is accomplishing through our power elite its plan for weakening our agriculture, on the eve of its eastward expansion."

Another article in that weekly warns that "the irresponsible" frivolity of the—ruling (the Editors)—elite may be rudely interrupted. Wrath is gathering in silence."

Is that indeed so?

The Calm Countryside

Most farmers are not keen to revolt. Unlike other occupational groups, they find it difficult to rapidly communicate and organize themselves for sudden protest actions, although they are always prone to complain.

A strike would mean to them material losses; they would have to either dump their milk into ditches or be left with unsold meat. After all, even the occupation of public buildings means abandoning the farmstead to the caprices of fate and neighbors.

When the prices of some farm products drop, peasants most often protest by curtailing their production and increasing the production of other products.

Actual protest actions are exceptions, such as last year's demonstration in Mlawa or the two-hour blockade of roads throughout the country which made the cities aware of the power dormant in the countryside. Now that blockade serves as an electoral slogan that is being utilized to sanction sharper deeds by activists.

The foci of possible eruption are few and confined to local dairies. In general the peasants prefer to wait and count on the common sense of the authorities who, they expect, will sooner or later relent and grant certain preferences.

The peasants are having problems with selling grain: The prices are low and the prospects poor. They complain about the prices of farm machinery and implements, which are rising faster than the prices of farm products. They have cashflow problems, especially in winter when the cows yield less milk but prices do not increase correspondingly. They cannot invest in production, because the interest rate on loans is too high.

On the other hand, in, e.g., Lublin Voivodship farmers are increasingly interested in foreign loans. Their first attempts to invest in agricultural and food processing have been made.

Will Spring Belong to the Peasants?

Such is, I believe, the mood of the peasants.

But it may become radicalized. Especially in the spring, when fertilizers and seeds have to be bought and taxes paid. It is then that agitation may prove effective.

Intelligence Chief on Internal Dangers, Activities

91EP0291A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 3,
19 Jan 91 p 7

[Interview with Andrzej Milczanowski; chief of the Office of State Security, by Andrzej Mozolowski; place and date not given: "A Computer Instead of a Dossier"]

[Text] [Mozolowski] The quondam SB [Security Service] used to protect communism against those who thought differently. What specifically does the Office of State Security protect against? What are the forms in which that protection is expressed?

[Milczanowski] I would say that the duty of the Office of State Security is to monitor thoroughly, competently, and rapidly all foreign and domestic dangers to national security and to keep the government continually posted about these dangers.

[Mozolowski] What foreign dangers do you specifically perceive, e.g., on the part of our eastern neighbor?

[Milczanowski] Anyone who reads the newspapers perceives them. The [Soviet] political, social, and economic crises, the ethnic unrest—they all are dangers which may become more acute and whose consequences we may feel keenly. As, for example, in the form of disruptions in the shipments of natural gas and crude petroleum [to Poland, from the USSR], and not only that. It is thus natural that we have alerted our intelligence services to predict and identify such matters, and also to investigate the extent to which they ensue from the difficulties encountered in extracting crude petroleum in the USSR or from the Soviet balance of payments, and the extent to which they ensue from deliberate intent of the Soviet government.

Or another matter, the coming exodus of refugees from the Soviet Union, which threatens Western Europe and Poland too.

[Mozolowski] Western sources estimate that wave of emigration at 5 million by the year 2000, and a substantial part of these 5 million will march across Poland.

[Milczanowski] Even only several hundred thousand would create a huge problem; that is clear. We must similarly identify, and predict, the dangers ensuing from the return home of the Soviet troops stationed in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and, of course, Poland. There are the dangers of desertion, sales of firearms to our indigenous criminals, and conflicts with the local inhabitants and authorities. We cannot neglect either keeping tabs on

what is happening in the neighboring republics of Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine.

I want you to understand me clearly. Good, friendly relations with the USSR and individual Soviet republics are important to Poland. But one needs to know a lot about one's friends. Thorough familiarity facilitates friendship. It is difficult to love a stranger, is not it?

[Mozolowski] Does this apply equally to Germany?

[Milczanowski] Yes, equally. The abandonment of the anti-German prejudices (and similarly of anti-Russian ones) cherished by a segment of our society must be based on facts in favor of it. It is our business to identify and investigate these facts. Likewise, historical experience points to the need to watch the national minorities vigilantly.

[Mozolowski] As for domestic dangers, does the Office of State Security attend to penetrating milieus of potential danger, such as groupings of anarchists, small profascist groups, the perpetrators of anti-Semitic excesses, etc?

[Milczanowski] My dear Sir, let me tell you that in general we are not engaged in operative, i.e., active, surveillance of any grouping, party, association, trade union, or social organization. We merely watch them attentively. We show our face only when violence is advocated or employed, that is, when laws are broken. Of course, this concerns only serious matters, because we are not going to chase after every stupid graffiti scribbling kid.

[Mozolowski] What do you mean by "watching attentively"? Or in other words, how do you collect information without engaging in surveillance?

[Milczanowski] From public sources. From newspapers, flyers, public comments, from participation in public rallies, etc. That is a rich lode of information. One needs only have the skill or even, I would say, the talent, for gathering and analyzing information, the kind of talent that, say, any good physician or reporter should have. This is being handled by a special assessment and information unit which obtains, evaluates, collates, and classifies these data and loads them into data bases from public sources.

[Mozolowski] On whom are these data kept? In other words, on what people do you keep dossiers?

[Milczanowski] No dossiers, sir. Now it is a computer.

[Mozolowski] If you type *POLITYKA* on the keyboard of that computer, would something appear on the screen?

[Milczanowski] The printer would print out basic information on your periodical and its staff, in conformity with a specified formula. All that information was obtained from, I repeat, public sources.

[Mozolowski] I wonder how have you classified us? As dangerous ones or protected ones?

[Milczanowski] One never knows, Mr. Editor, one never knows.... But seriously, you are classified as a player on the political scene.

[Mozolowski] Well, the preliminaries are over. Now is the time to ask fundamental questions. The Office of State Security is the formal continuator of the SB (security, intelligence, counterintelligence). In what fields has it abandoned that continuation and in what fields does it maintain it? Have many officers of the former SB been retained on the payroll of the Office of State Security? Can they be trusted?

[Milczanowski] The SB had often engaged in lawless and sometimes criminal actions. I hardly need emphasize that the Office of State Security has not done and shall not do so. The SB was an institution created to accomplish explicit political objectives, whereas the Office of State Security is completely apolitical. It protects national interests; that is all, and that is it. Our personnel may not belong to any political party or trade union. Please believe me when I say that if ever we are used as pawns in some political game I shall submit my resignation. Third, the SB's duties pertained mostly to repressions, whereas ours pertain chiefly to the provision of information. Fourth, the SB was interested in everything and everyone and engaged in "total surveillance," whereas ours is selective.

As for our personnel, most of them are the old cadres. They all were subjected to an extremely thorough vetting, which they passed successfully. Their professional qualifications are extremely high. I treat them in quite the same way as I treat newly hired employees, those from Solidarity and WiP [Freedom and Peace]. I support integration.

[Mozolowski] How well have the WiP people acquitted themselves?

[Milczanowski] Well. Consider for example Piotr Niemczyk, one of the founders of that group. Judging by his appearance you would not think much of him: he is bearded, wears a sweater, and looks as colorless as...

[Mozolowski] The minister of finance. Was that what you meant to say?

[Milczanowski] You said it, not I. But he turned out to be a good officer and director of one of the departments, and I only wish I had more people like him. Incidentally, let me add that I count on his beginning to wear a coat and tie.

[Mozolowski] They say that you also turned graduates of the Academy of Catholic Theology into intelligence or counterintelligence officers.

[Milczanowski] Sure. I have two such people, and they both are good. Antecedents do not matter; what matters

is a certain level of intellect, traits of character, higher educational background, and particular predispositions.

[Mozolowski] But they are amateurs! And it is said that you appointed them heads of branch offices.

[Milczanowski] They are not heads of branch offices. But the actual heads all are new. They are mostly experienced lawyers, so they are not that green at the gills. Moreover, they undergo intensive training. It so happens that this month branch-office heads and their deputies are beginning their third training cycle. They learn operational work, the conduct of counterintelligence, the operating procedures of the services and their cooperation, as well as anything else they need to know in their positions. Moreover, we are implementing a new curriculum for regular and advanced training, in the domain of intelligence and counterintelligence, too, with the assistance of lecturers from the special services of Western countries.

[Mozolowski] How do you comment on the accusations made by the press concerning certain of your officers?

[Milczanowski] They are unjust and absurd. The reputation of Colonel Jasik, director of the intelligence directorate, was rudely assaulted. Mr. Szaniawski imputed that he is a KGB agent! What were his proofs? None. Slander of this kind is base. I have by now gotten to know Col. Jasik well. He is a highly qualified officer, a superb professional whose loyalty I consider unquestioned. Besides, a man's worth is demonstrated by his accomplishments at work, and in the case of Col. Jasik they are considerable. Minister Kozlowski recalled in an interview granted to ZYCIE WARSZAWY a recent project directed by that officer, a project of a veritable "James Bond" nature which may some day serve as the topic of a major sensational novel; a project crowned with complete success and entailing the risk of loss of life.

[Mozolowski] Could I learn more about it?

[Milczanowski] Unfortunately not. Except that this is greatly to the credit of Col. Jasik. On the other hand, the groundless, reprehensible press attacks on our personnel, such as were launched by certain periodicals, e.g., the Krakow CZAS, are creating an inauspicious climate around the Office of State Security, scaring off potential applicants, and discouraging those already working here. And yet, we are short of personnel.

[Mozolowski] How many people are employed by the Office of State Security?

[Milczanowski] I can say that they number only a fraction of those employed by the former SB, which had employed 25,000. Our budget accounts for a very small part of the budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Mozolowski] But are the salaries high?

[Milczanowski] Quite the contrary, unfortunately. They are about the same as police salaries. Besides, once every few days I find on my desk requests for resignation. The reason: low salaries and unfriendly climate toward our

personnel. Thus, e.g., counterintelligence officers encounter an irrational and unconcealed hostility at some institutions. This complicates their work and discourages them. We prize very highly social acceptance, but we rarely encounter it.

[Mozolowski] How do you recruit people for the Office of State Security? Can anyone who feels a vocation for this kind of work, say, for intelligence work, simply apply for a job with you?

[Milczanowski] As a rule, it is we who take the initiative. We must know whom we are to employ. Besides, we try to select the best and the brightest, graduates of universities, polytechnics, and other higher educational institutions.

Special services are often viewed through the prism of gripping spy novels. But in reality they involve arduous and exhausting labor that requires, among other things, good health, great mental resilience, toughness, and dedication. Of course, it requires a keen intellect and corresponding knowledge, considerable vigor, feeling of responsibility, and ability to predict and judge.

The principal purpose is to preemptively gather and properly assess information as well as to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the competent authorities. A considerable part of that information is acquired by means of a meticulous and systematized collection of seemingly irrelevant (and often accessible publicly) data. This is an extremely arduous occupation that requires knowledge, experience, intuition, and patience. Collating these data and subsequently assessing their whole fairly often yields valuable results.

Certain information can be obtained only by operational means. Every operational undertaking must be thoroughly planned and prepared, but even so many involve greater or smaller risk of failure and the attendant consequences.

Risk is an inseparable element of the work of the special services. The point is that risk is thoroughly calculated. In other words, the point is that the desired objective be worth a particular risk. In this connection, everything must be done to reduce to a minimum the risks of a given situation.

It is worth recalling the occasional situations in which, e.g., an intelligence officer posted abroad faces a particular danger and has to rely on his own resources and skills alone. I mention this in order to make it clear that, although working in the special services offers the possibility of self-fulfillment, it requires, like few other professions, a constant feeling of responsibility and represents a continuous and severe yardstick of the worth of an employee.

[Mozolowski] Could you describe the organizational structure of the Office of State Security?

[Milczanowski] We have two so-called field directorates: intelligence and counterintelligence; in addition there is

the directorate of investigation and the departments of surveillance, technology, codes, assessment and information, coordination and forecasts, personnel and training, records and archives, finance, administration and business, and the office of the director. We maintain 14 branch offices, along with field sections of these offices.

[Mozolowski] Is the Office of State Security concerned with occupational and organized crime, e.g., with the Polish and Soviet mafias? The police are not concerned with this.

[Milczanowski] But they are. As for us, we are only beginning to be concerned, though only with organized crime of international nature. I have established for this purpose a special department in the counterintelligence directorate.

[Mozolowski] Now that the system of society in Poland has changed, have the activities of foreign intelligence services grown weaker or more intensive? Does counterintelligence assess them as grave and menacing?

[Milczanowski] Of a certainty they have not grown weaker; that is all I can say. We do assess as serious the danger of penetration by foreign intelligence services. But steps must be taken to prevent the consequences of that danger from becoming menacing. That is what we are for.

[Mozolowski] Does the Office of State Security engage in intelligence operations also in Western countries?

[Milczanowski] We would not be a serious institution if we were to lack information on what is happening in, e.g., Germany or the United States. We attempt to learn what is happening there, and where important decisions are taken, especially those concerning Poland. Besides this concerns not only the so-called East and West. Do you think for example that what is happening in the Persian Gulf is of no concern to us or concerns us only in terms of the price of a barrel of oil? We must consider that in the event that armed conflict breaks out, the danger of terrorist attacks on persons and facilities in our country is bound to increase. The Office of State Security is not and cannot be inactive in this matter.

[Mozolowski] There is the well-known comment by Professor Brzezinski that Colonel Kuklinski should be decorated with a high Polish order for his contributions to American intelligence service. Do you agree with that opinion?

[Milczanowski] This was a very risky statement. Risky because it would sanction the view that being an agent of a foreign country is a question of individual conscience. The adverse consequences to the work of the Office of State Security and to national security can be readily seen. History will of a certainly judge some day that particular case.

[Mozolowski] An issue of the recent past: in your opinion, should the Office of State Security have investigated presidential candidates (especially if they are dark horses)? Why has it not done so?

[Milczanowski] How do you know that it has not done so? Be assured that yes, it has done so. Except that this office was established to provide information to the government, not to reporters. Hence also, all those who felt so irritated by the lack of information should bear in mind Article 12, Paragraph 1, of the Law on the Office of State Security, passed by Sejm on 6 April 1990. That article states, "Providing persons other than courts of law and public prosecutors with information on citizens obtained while performing operational and intelligence activities is prohibited."

[Mozolowski] Deputy Cimoszewicz [one of the presidential candidates] complained that his meetings with the population of Bialystok Voivodship were the subject of "operational activities" by your people. Does he have a point?

[Milczanowski] I can definitely state that we engaged in no such activities, and besides Deputy Cimoszewicz's complaint was not addressed at us.

[Mozolowski] Does the Office of State Security have adequate personnel, technical, and financial resources for exercising its highly responsible duties?

[Milczanowski] The answer can be readily foreseen: no. That also is why I am unremittently laboring to obtain them.

[Mozolowski] How can a "secret" agency like yours be subjected to social control, considering that it should be?

[Milczanowski] By a parliamentary committee, and by the prime minister and the government, and in particular by the minister of internal affairs and by the office of the president. Is that enough?

[Mozolowski] But what will happen to the secrecy of your projects if all these committees and individuals snoop through your file cabinets?

[Milczanowski] The supervision and monitoring of our agency from the top are confined to its budget and financial management, along with designation of duties and reports on their performance. Naturally, no outsider will scrutinize lists of our agents and informants. That is quite clear, is not it?

[Mozolowski] You hardly seem to enjoy publicity or love granting interviews. What has prompted you to let POLITYKA interview you?

[Milczanowski] First, because I have been a reader of yours from the outset and I greatly esteem your weekly. Second, I would like to tell your readers something I consider very important. I want to present to them what I would define by the fashionable though pompous concept of "the philosophy of the office." Let me repeat:

I want to persuade the public that the Office of State Security is not and shall not be a tool of anyone, of any formal or informal group, that it is a totally apolitical institution and one serving exclusively the state. And also that all of its personnel equally deserve the trust of the society, just as they have deserved my trust. Anyone who misplaces that trust, who fails in his performance, shall not remain here a day more.

[Mozolowski] Thank you for the conversation.

[Box, p 7]

Andrzej Milczanowski, 51 years old, married (wife a notary public, daughter a physician, resident in Szczecin). During 1962-68, he was the county public prosecutor in Szczecin. From August 1980 until December 1989 he was a NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity activist. During 1968-80 he served as a legal adviser. A strike participant in August 1980, director of the press office of a Solidarity regional board, and participant in the Warski Shipyard strike, in December 1981 he was arrested and sentenced by a military court to five years in prison (a sentence reduced by an amnesty to two years and four months, which he served in their entirety). Since July 1984 the head of underground Solidarity for the West Pomeranian region. Member of the TKK (Solidarity's Provisional Coordinating Commission) and of the Presidium of the KKW (Solidarity's National Executive Committee) and participant in the August-September 1988 strike at the Port of Szczecin. Since 11 May 1990 deputy chief, and since 1 August 1990 chief, of the Office of State Security.

Comments on Anti-Semitism, Polish Jewry

91EP0262A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
24 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Stanislaw Krajewski, resident representative of the American Jewish Congress in Poland, by Krystyna Lubelska; place and date not given: "The Wall"]

[Text] [Lubelska] Could you tell me how many Jews live in Poland at present?

[Krajewski] That is a good question to which there is no good answer. First, because one would have to define who is a Jew. I can thus only say that the Jews who are associated with Jewish organizations, who participate, if only rarely, in Jewish religious or cultural life, who respect in some way the Jewish traditions, number only several thousand. The number of persons with Jewish ancestors is probably greater, but it is unknown. Besides, such persons do not feel themselves to be Jewish.

[Lubelska] Owing to the shortage of Jews, people begin to nominate them.

[Krajewski] The word Jew functions in Poland often as an epithet. There are, for example, the wall graffiti "LKS-Jews" [LKS—Lodz Athletic Club]. That is how

the opposing soccer team, the enemy team, is called. Thus, the connotation is that of a severe insult. Certain graffiti have a definitely Hitlerite connotation, such as "Gas the Jews" or "Jude raus." Of course, I don't want to sound too dramatic or to overestimate the creativity of wall graffiti. I am aware that often young people daub a wall without really understanding what they are doing. But instances of aggressive behavior also occur; for example, last year windows at the Jewish Historical Institute were broken twice. I am aware that a single individual can do that, and hence I am not attaching undue importance to that event. But still....

[Lubelska] During a broadcast dealing with anti-Semitism on Radio Program III, I heard a comment which made my hair stand on end. One listener declared, with practically the entire country listening, that Jews are not at present in power, so they pretend that there is anti-Semitism in order to again sneakily seize power. What is that? Stupidity or cruelty?

[Krajewski] I would say that fairly often many Poles absurdly try to blame Jews for all the evils and all the problems existing in Poland. This is a threat to not only Jews but the entire political life in Poland. On the other hand, many people, even men of goodwill, are trying to deny the existence of Polish anti-Semitism.

[Lubelska] I confess that I have had problems with this. When I visited the United States I often denied accusations of Polish anti-Semitism, out of simple embarrassment. Should we discuss this problem among ourselves and with the world, and if yes, how?

[Krajewski] Anti-Semitism is a phenomenon present not only in Poland but in many Western countries. The only problem is that in our country it is tolerated. Abroad it simply is not done to be a decent human being or a serious politician and at the same time to display an anti-Jewish bias. In this country, conversely, one can be a decent citizen and at the same time a hard-bitten anti-Semite. Strangely, one somehow does not conflict with the other.

[Lubelska] Meaning that we should not remain silent?

[Krajewski] Of course, pretending that the problem does not exist solves nothing. Evil must be actively opposed. In France there exists, as in Poland, a traditional anti-Semitism. In that country, e.g., a Jewish cemetery had recently been desecrated. The demonstration against such deeds was attended by President Mitterand, other major politicians from various parties, and authoritative personages. That deed was not only brought to light but also sharply condemned.

[Lubelska] In this country politicians are often asked about their ethnic origin.

[Krajewski] Sure, and even at major rallies, during the electoral campaign, voters asked whether the future president would make sure that the government would not consist of Jews, and suchlike questions. The fact that

somebody asked such a question in itself means nothing. This may happen. Yet not infrequently such questions caused the audiences to applaud, and that in itself meant something more and was simply disturbing. If, in order to be elected, one feels it necessary to assure the electorate that one is 100-percent Polish, this means that anti-Semitism in Poland is not only widespread but also accepted. Neither the questions about the ethnic origin of candidates nor the answers given were treated as unworthy; instead, they were included among electoral arguments of equal importance to, say, the candidate's economic program. This signifies that a Jew who lives in Poland lacks the same rights as the others and, at most, can be only tolerated. Thus it is hardly surprising that, when Polish politicians recruited in this way votes and supports this, this produced a poor impression on both the world and a large number of Poles.

[Lubelska] You then admit that there exist Poles who resent and protest against anti-Semitic attitudes.

[Krajewski] There are very many such people in Poland. In my own milieu, that of academe, I not only feel no ill will on the part of my colleagues but also sense support for my Jewish commitment and activities.

[Lubelska] You are the first person to represent the American Jewish Congress in Poland after the war. Could you say something about that organization?

[Krajewski] It is one of the largest organizations of American Jews, and one of its principal purposes is to advocate equal civil rights for all, not just for the Jewish minority. For example, for many years the congress has been participating in the civil rights struggle for Blacks and American Indians.

[Lubelska] While in Los Angeles I talked with the Director of the Congress Mr. Henry Siegmann and learned that he had, along with several other people, visited Poland. He spoke openly of Polish anti-Semitism, but also of positive changes in our country.

[Krajewski] Representatives of the American Jewish Congress traveled to Poland toward the end of 1989, not so much in order to combat anti-Semitic attitudes as to witness the fascinating changes to the better that occurred in our country. They are definitely in favor of the Polish reforms, if only through their support of economic contacts, thanks to the ties between the congress and the world of business.

[Lubelska] The American Jewish Congress also maintains contact with the Polish Church.

[Krajewski] It has already addressed two open letters to the church. The first, dated last November, concerned the nonappearance of the major document announced by the church on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the encyclical "Nostra Aetate." In that letter, too, representatives of the congress drew attention to the disturbing news on the growth of anti-Semitism in Poland.

The second letter, addressed to Polish bishops, represents the response, or the commentary, of the congress concerning the pastoral letter on anti-Semitism recited in churches on 20 January. In its letter the congress points out that the bishops raised fundamental issues affecting Polish anti-Jewish attitudes. The letter also raises the problem of the Jewish Communists by stating clearly that to be a Communist is tantamount to opposing the Jewish religion and abandoning the Jewish tradition. The profession of communist ideology by Jews was a betrayal of their origin just as much as in the case of the Communists of Christian origin. In my opinion, the Jews who became Communists after the war often did so out of a feeling of loneliness, out of lack of social as well as family ties, because all their nearest and dearest had died.

The congress is in accord with the opinion of the bishops that there is no reason for believing that the siting of the extermination camps in Poland had anything to do with Polish anti-Semitism. Such opinions, expressed fairly often in the West, are unjust. Poles, more than any other nation—we read on in the letter of the congress—were witnesses to the mass extermination of Jews. In addition to those who had heroically helped Jews, there were others, perhaps even a majority, who had remained indifferent to that extermination. Hardly conceivable as it is, the congress declared, the tragedy of the Holocaust has not lessened Polish prejudices and phobias vis a vis Jews.

[Lubelska] As witnesses of the Holocaust, Poles should be rather spokesmen for the defense than for the prosecution. My hope is that we shall together live long enough to see times when members of yet another new unsuccessful government will no longer be accused of improper origin.

[Krajewski] I believe that these times will come. In Poland there is sufficient common sense and goodwill for anti-Semitic arguments to become trivial. I am certain that this shall also signify the demolition of the wall presenting an obstacle to Polish democracy. Only, when will that happen?

ROMANIA

Bishop Tokes Accused of 'Lying Without Shame'

91BA0307A Bucharest ROMANIA MARE in Romanian
11 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by Professor Dr. Ion Manzatu, chairman of the Republican Party: "Pastor Laszlo Tokes Is Lying Without Shame or Fear of God"]

[Text] Pastor Laszlo Tokes recently gave an interview for ADEVARUL in which he as usual delivered himself of all kinds of aberrations and calumnies. Among other things, however, probably as a last ditch effort to create confusion in this country that he hates, L. Tokes allowed himself several direct remarks about me. Essentially L.

Tokes was trying to accredit two more blatant lies: One, that I allegedly tried to form an alliance with him, although he didn't say what kind of alliance, where, or how; secondly, that the above proposal was motivated by the fact that my mother was Hungarian and that her name had been Margit Biro.

By now the whole world knows that Laszlo Tokes is a spreader of slander and lies of the basest kind. No need for me to cite facts and dates to prove that, the press and even the Romanian Parliament have done so in abundance. Recently, RENASTEREA BANATEANA reproduced a copy of his act of treason toward priests and colleagues (dated 1975), while CORRIERE DELLA SERRA wrote about L. Tokes' criminal instigations to violence and to a fresh revolution in Romania, thus clearly testifying to the fact that this wearer of priestly garb has long stopped serving the love of fatherland and fellowmen, not to mention the service of God and honor.

And if to all the above we add the venomous statements that L. Tokes made everywhere where he peddled his lies, from the United States to Germany and from France to Hungary, in his efforts to denigrate the Romanian people and the nobility of character of the people in the country that is formally his, too, but which he despises and abuses at every opportunity—suffice it to recall what he stated at the White House in the spring of 1990, when he asserted that even the Romanian language is a means of oppressing the Hungarians in Romania—we will realize that this pastor has assumed other missions than to serve God, heal people's souls, and spread understanding among speakers of different languages born in the same land.

I met only once with the bearer of the name L. Tokes for a few minutes around April 1990 after his return from the United States, where he brutally and unscrupulously ran down the Romanian people and their historical virtues. During that short meeting—which I mentioned in my interview for VIITORUL ROMANESC—I asked L. Tokes for only one thing: to use his spiritual influence to restore peace in Transylvania and not to incite, like his brother did and continues to do in Tirgu Mures, the Hungarians against Romanians because they don't stand any chance and that can only lead to violent confrontations and futile bloodshed. Secondly, anyone may consult my parents' birth certificates and note that my grandparents' names—i.e., three generations back—were Ana and David Manzatu and Susana and Macazie Muresan, and that my parents' names were Ioan Manzatu and Margareta Manzatu nee Muresan-Sipos. So where do you get the Margit Biro, Parson L. Tokes?

Thus, to restore the favorable atmosphere he enjoyed, the former false hero of the Romanian Revolution—because the real heroes were those who defended his life with their lives, not realizing his intentions and habits—L. Tokes, having forgotten that even the devil takes precautions when he lies, is using slander and lies as political arguments and is trying to discredit, just like his

comrades in the UDMR [Democratic Union of Romanian Magyars] leadership, people who were and are deeply devoted to stability, good understanding, and truth, whatever it may be, by labeling them extremists.

However much I may respect the Magyar nation and all the other nationalities in the world, in the name of love for the Romanian people I can only say that those members of the Hungarian minority who still hope that L. Tokes and the other UDMR leaders represent their legitimate interests, are making a bitter mistake.

I want to conclude by adding that when ROMANIA MARE spoke out so resolutely for immediately deporting L. Tokes from Romania as a chauvinist and instigator, or when Romanian Parliament member Mr. Vacaru recently requested that the pastor be indicted for serious acts of national treason, I had some reservations. Now, however, I am convinced—if I still needed convincing—that the solution suggested by Mr. Vacaru was correct both morally and legally, and I support it because the limits of our patience have long been overstepped.

CADA Internal Disagreement Made Public

Communique Criticizes Brucan

91BA0303A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 17 Jan 91 p 2

[Communique: "On Behalf of CADA [Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army]]"]

[Text] In the name of truth, military honor, and respect for the Romanian people, whose interests we swore to defend, the members of CADA [Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army] declare the following:

1. In view of the current internal and international political-military situation, we believe that the stability of Romanian society depends on the stability of the Romanian Army, which at present depends on Lieutenant General Victor Stanculescu continuing as minister of defense. Our statement is based on the following considerations:

- Lt. Gen. Stanculescu is the only Romanian Army general who effectively supported the process of democratization of the military system.
- He provided the necessary conditions for depoliticizing the Army and was the only general who publicly repudiated his RCP [Romanian Communist Party] membership.
- He supported the establishment of Democratic Associations of Military Cadres in Army units.
- He proceeded to modernize the training of the Romanian Army with a view to revitalizing its combat capability.
- He initiated and encouraged a process of rejuvenation of military command cadres.

—Although he retired some CADA members to the reserves, he supported the implementation in the Army of the principles formulated by the committee, something that encourages us to hope that he will reexamine the accusations leveled at the officers in question in accordance with military laws and regulations and will decide to reactivate them in a spirit of military honor and dignity.

—Lt. Gen. Stanculescu's analytical powers and judgment, his intelligence, training, and experience, his self-control and the patriotic feelings that inspire him make us firmly believe that at decisive moments he will be able to adopt the best solutions for the benefit of the country and the people.

2. We want to express our disapproval for the biased statements made by Mr. Silviu Brucan on Romanian Television on 30 December 1990, whereby he tried to deliberately falsify the history of the Romanian nation, distorting the truth about the events of December 1989. We find reprehensible the silence of the Defense Ministry Press Office (which has recently been very active), which has still not taken a stand on this matter.

In the name of the people who died for the ideals of the revolution and in the name of those who will succeed us, we feel a moral and patriotic obligation to tell the truth about the historic events we witnessed. We want to remind Mr. Silviu Brucan that when General Militaru appeared on television on 22 December 1989, the Romanian Army had already joined the Revolution, which had won by chasing the dictator Ceausescu out of the Central Committee building, and that no weapons were used either in Bucharest or elsewhere in the country.

Mr. Silviu Brucan, once again you have tried to lie to this nation. Do you think that the Romanian Army could obey the orders of a civilian who had left it 15 years earlier and who illegally donned the uniform of a general and claimed to represent the Romanian Army?

3. CADA represents the interests of the military cadres who responded to the 12 February 1990 Appeal, who wish for stability in Romanian society, and who hope that this society will be genuinely changed along democratic principles.

In view of the above considerations we are against people who publish and talk on behalf of the CADA without belonging to it and without being empowered by its members.

[Signed] CADA

Communique Rejected

91BA0303B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 31 Jan 91 p 2

[Statement by CADA [Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army]]

[Text] In connection with the communique "On Behalf of CADA [Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army]" published in ROMANIA LIBERA of 17 January 1991, CADA declares the following:

1. The document was drafted and sent to the press by a group of three CADA members without prior consultation with their colleagues on whose behalf the communique was arbitrarily signed.

2. This incident marked the culminating point of attempts to discredit the ideals of transforming the Army and annihilate CADA recently pursued by the minister of national defense in complicity with Lieutenant Colonel Ion Barbuta (the originator of the above communique). Lt. Col. Barbuta and his colleagues were unable to resist offers of high-ranking positions and blackmail or threats of retirement to the reserves.

3. CADA rejects this attempt to falsify the image of Gen. Stanculescu, whose incontestable guilt the entire committee unequivocally declared in the press communiques issued in ROMANIA LIBERA Nos. 276 and 230 of 1990. At that time CADA requested Gen. Stanculescu's resignation from his post and demanded that he be put

on trial. The appearance, less than two months after that position was publicly expressed, of a "CADA" signed communique idolizing Gen. Stanculescu makes any further comment on its signatories and their intentions superfluous.

4. Along the same line, CADA joins the viewpoint expressed by the Coordinating Committee of the Action "For Military Justice" on 18 January 1991.

[Signed] CADA

Editorial note—We can only express our regret that a CADA "youth wing" had to appear! In point of fact, the disagreements were caused by maneuvers by the Defense Ministry leadership who managed to divide the group by less than subtle means: simply by retiring some of the CADA members to the reserves! While we will continue to comment on the moral aspects of the problem whenever warranted, we want to emphasize that, in the wake of the above text, we will not provide space for a new "war of communiques." Anyone with opinions worthy of general interest will have to express them under their own signature and responsibility.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Success of 1st Privatization Auction Claimed

91CH0341D Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 28 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article: "Small Privatization Starts; Thousands Turn Into Millions at First Auction"]

[Text] Small privatization started with the first auction of Prague stores on the last weekend in January. There were 165 bidders, 68 of them on Saturday.

With great public interest, 16 of the first 20 businesses were legally auctioned off in the meeting hall of the Magistrate's Office of the capital city of Prague.

In addition to Domus and Moskva, a third unit was dropped from the list at the last minute, namely the building housing the Pod Kavalirkou food store. It was removed from the list because the former owner of the property announced his intention to reclaim it. The biggest surprise was the invalidating of the seventh Saturday auction, in which the price of the Electrohousehold Appliance store on the Vinohradska Trida reached 4.26 million Czech korunas [Kcs] after more than an hour of bidding. The problem was that the high bid was submitted by a representative of the Intercom cooperative organization, which is against regulations. The law does not allow cooperatives to participate in auctions. The mistake had been made by an employee of the privatization commission, who had entered the individual on the list of bidders. The store will now be auctioned again. If the cooperative member had not participated, the high bidders would have been the Truhlar brothers who currently sell fastening materials on Ruzova Street. They were willing to pay only Kcs10,000 less than the cooperative.

The total value of the auctioned businesses was Kcs22,020,000, in comparison with the total asking prices of Kcs2,104,000. The proceeds will be deposited in a special account of the Ministry for National Property Administration and Privatization. The director of the economics division of the Ministry, Eng. Jan Princ, informed us that for the first two years these funds can be used only to pay compensation related to the restitution law, to defray costs related to privatization commission

activities, and to pay the obligations of insolvent enterprises that fail during small privatization.

The doubts of many as to whether anything at all would be sold at the first auction were convincingly dispelled at the first bidding, for a fruit and vegetable store, which was purchased for 50 times the asking price, and at the second bidding, for a similar store, which went for 70 times the asking price (asking price of Kcs5,000, bid price of Kcs340,000). The new owners have made various estimates, which include the view that our citizens do not have great chances for success in competition with emigrants. Nevertheless, the store manager of the food store on Zbraslav, Anna Wertheimova, bought the store and its building for Kcs1.65 million. The asking price of the building was reduced just before the auction from the original Kcs1.03 million to Kcs892,000 because of a reduction in the size of the lot.

On Sunday the first clothing store went on the block. The store was the Maja, on Zelezna Street (almost 90 prospective buyers had participated in two store tours). In view of its attractive location near the Old Town Square the winning bid of Kcs3.56 million for renting the store seemed low to many experts. The winning bidder was M. Liska, who emigrated to Austria 20 years ago, and who is considering turning the store into a luxury leather goods store.

Auctioneer Eng. Ivo Gavlas, owner of the auction agency, is training some 800 additional auctioneers for the entire Czech Republic. He shared his impressions of the first auction with us. "It was fantastic, I am very pleased that the auction was conducted in a disciplined manner and without complications. Despite the fact that nothing of this sort has taken place in the past 40 years, people understood the system immediately and behaved as though they attended auctions regularly. I think, however, that the three-minute limit prolongs the auction unnecessarily. In my view, one minute to think things over would be fully sufficient. We will be able to tell after a little more practice. After all, we have just started the process."

In comparison with Saturday, the average price of the stores sold on Sunday was substantially higher. On the first day a total of six stores were auctioned for a total of Kcs4.55 million. This amount had already been exceeded after the second store was auctioned yesterday. The next auction will take place on 10 February 1991.

Stores Sold Off at First Small Privatization Auction

Type of Store	Address	Asking Price (in Thousands of Kcs)	Auction Price (in Thousand of Kcs)	Area in Square Meters
Fruits and vegetables	Konevova 160	11	580	140
Fruits and vegetables	Na Klauďance 30	5	340	96
Fruits and vegetables	Psencikova 797	35	620	166
Fruits and vegetables	Prubezna 46	29	460	96
Food store and building	Otinska 1247	454	900	114
Food store and building	Zitavskeho 74	892	1,650	337

Stores Sold Off at First Small Privatization Auction (Continued)

Type of Store	Address	Asking Price (in Thousands of Kcs)	Auction Price (in Thousand of Kcs)	Area in Square Meters
Clothing	Zelezna	129	3,560	79
Textiles	Anglicka 25	21	1,650	103
Textiles	Blanicka 21	100	2,500	249
Textiles	Cuban Revolution Square 7	32	2,200	162
Household goods	Lovosicka 788	47	170	359
Household goods	Rabasova 1	128	3,180	477
Pastry	Belehradska 9	32	500	86
Food	Antala Staska 55	124	1,000	429
Shoes	Jugoslavskych Partyzanu 17	41	1,000	62
Textiles	Na Porici 8	24	1,710	62

HUNGARY

Smallholders Chief Clarifies Agrarian Program

91CH0377B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
23 Jan 91 p unknown

[Interview with Smallholders Party Executive Secretary Sandor Olah by Vera Lendvai; place and date not given: "Producing for the Pit Is Saddening"—first paragraph is NEPSZAVA introduction]

[Text] A 45-page text entitled "The Agrarian Policy of the Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers and Citizen Party" has recently been made available to the public. In it the Smallholders describe the most important, pivotal points of their program, including the settlement of land ownership issues, the role of family farming, and the way Smallholders relate to cooperatives and to the agrarian intelligentsia. We asked Party Executive Secretary Sandor Olah to grant us an interview concerning all of the above.

[Olah] We did not have a detailed program because we wrote on our banner "property settlement," an easy, condensed election watchword. Settlement of ownership conditions is a basic issue because it affects agricultural operations as a whole, including the food industry. Now that we are in the process of creating a law on compensation and property settlement, we recognize that our election promise appears to have been realized, and that it is possible to prepare a comprehensive agrarian program.

[Lendvai] The peasantry impatiently awaits this program. One cannot work without a program. Many wild shoots sprouted with prevailing uncertainty, and we witnessed spitefulness which enhanced neither work nor the Smallholders Party.

[Olah] Another matter that stood in the path of developing an agrarian program was the fact that the Smallholders Party and the people who identified with us were truly opposed to those interested in collectivist management. We feel that by now a significant part of the

agrarian intelligentsia has come to understand that the interests of the agricultural branch are best served not by creating enemies, but by seeking ways of cooperation between the various trends. This is so, even though a significant part of the agrarian intelligentsia functions in the framework of the Agrarian Alliance. Only a very small group has no interest in settling ownership conditions. This group consists of people who obtained leadership positions in cooperatives as a last resort, thanks to various personal connections. This applies only to 100 or 200 persons from among the 20,000 to 30,000 members of the agrarian intelligentsia.

[Lendvai] In terms of Smallholders propaganda, every agricultural leader was called a "green baron." These people were deeply offended by that. Many of them left the agricultural field.

[Olah] The term "green baron" is merely a condensed adjective. It applies to persons who acquired positions regardless of their lack of ability. They demanded certain feudalistic prerogatives for themselves. Not even a cultured aristocrat would have openly asserted such prerogatives. I would not attribute the departure of many valuable persons exclusively to this matter, but rather to the disadvantaged and hopeless situation of agriculture. I now recognize that the Smallholders Party is also at fault. We should have published a timely comprehensive agrarian plan; one that would have convinced every member of the agrarian intelligentsia that there was an increased need for him in an agriculture to be rearranged in the direction of family farming.

[Lendvai] Are you thinking exclusively in terms of a family framework?

[Olah] Good cooperatives will also have a future, in different ways than today, of course. They will be based on voluntary association under democratic leadership. The bad ones will fall apart anyway, but in my view, this should be of no concern. Specialized cooperatives are

strong because they operate on the basis of ownership and people do not work in these cooperatives as hired laborers. There will be a need for cooperative services, joint sales, and processing based on associations.

[Lendvai] I heard earlier that leading Smallholders were conducting negotiations with Western firms concerning the importation of small machinery, based on favorable credit terms. In reality, we find no trace of such imports.

[Olah] New farms do not regard the procurement of machinery as their first task. People continue to cooperate voluntarily. As long as we are talking in terms of 100-acre family farms, the cooperative's combine may be leased for harvesting. I know that dormant capital exists in the villages. Peasants will never invest their money in bonds or other securities. Their fathers and grandfathers have been ruined many times by one or another war bond or peace bond. We are indeed conducting negotiations with firms from all over the world, from Japan to Canada. They are prepared to deal, but a rational change in the production structure is needed in order to assess the market potential.

[Lendvai] Your program also addresses the sales issue....

[Olah] I come from Hodmezovasarhely, an area where onions are grown. In that area it is customary to say that nothing makes a peasant more bitter than having to produce for the pit, i.e., if he cannot sell his produce he will have to let it go to waste by burying it in a pit. I am convinced that in this regard we are five years behind the West, and 10 years ahead of the East.

[Lendvai] What response will your theses evoke?

[Olah] We are counting on a mixed reception, although recently some opposition representatives mainly from significant agricultural areas have made some inquiries. On the other hand, we have a hunch that we will be confronted with a narrow-minded attitude as far as the law on compensation is concerned. A national consensus already exists in terms of expectations. We also need a consensus in legislation. After all, this is an epochal law, it deals in part with the land issue, and this issue always appears on the agenda in times of large-scale social movements. In my view, the ownership change is proceeding too peacefully and too softly in Hungary.

[Lendvai] People would have difficulty carrying the already heavy burden and the uncertainty that would emerge as a result of a more decisive change.

[Olah] That's not what I have in mind. Twisted legal considerations and pseudo problems stand in the way of progress regarding these matters. The revolutionary character of changing ownership is not fiction. We now have an opportunity to make up for what has been delayed for 200 years.

[Lendvai] How do you view land sales, a process that is yet to begin? Despite the fact that land is not yet being sold, speculation is already taking advantage of impoverishment.

[Olah] The opportunity to sell land is a basic condition for a market economy and for middle-class development. Yet, I believe that the Smallholders Party will be first to request a moratorium on land sales in order to prevent looting. A certain sense of cooperation is beginning to take shape in the parliament. Previously, some coalition partners felt that one should not even turn his eyes toward seats occupied by socialists. Today, people of various persuasions get together in the course of committee work and conflicts. Our political forces intend to cooperate with every party seated in the parliament.

Road to Wealth of New Millionaires Diverse

91CH0346B Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian No 2,
11 Jan 91 p 91

[Article by Tamas G. Koranyi: "Hungarian Rockefellers"; article is reprinted from A VILAG, 2 Jan 1991—first paragraph is TALLOZO introduction]

[Text] A journalist has an easy task searching for the superrich in, for instance, the United States. Although the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] will not give out names, the data on major companies are in the public domain, and one can find out with relative exactness who owns the majority of stocks in which company. Illicit assets will sooner or later also find their way into legitimate associations, but real billionaires are not mafiosi at any rate. The situation is different in Hungary.

Our biggest taxpayers, such as Pinter of Kecel or Petrenko of Ozd, are well known but, with their assets of 100 to 500 million forints, they are hardly among the 10 most wealthy in Hungary.

One can be rich in many ways. If we take the world market prices of art objects as a yardstick, then the wealthiest person of the 1960's and 1970's was Gedeon Gerloczy, who owned three-fourths of Csontvary's entire works. Even today there are art collections estimated to be worth 100 million (they are insured for only a fraction of that), but they represent wealth in theory only because it is irrelevant that a Turner painting is worth 350,000 pounds in England (i.e., 42 million forints) if it is protected, but if a public collection, which has the right of advance purchase, has only 350,000 forints for this purpose at a domestic art auction....

Although real estate speculators of the last 10 or 15 years, who were primarily a few Budapest lawyers, who acquired several lots in districts II and XII under the names of members of their families, may also be included in the 100-to-500-million-forint category, they are far from being superrich. (Not to mention the fact that they must also reckon with having to pay taxes in selling real estate even though they can balance that by buying other real estate and usufructuary rights.) This same category also includes construction entrepreneurs who have built 10 or 12 townhouses every year and have moved every two years into villas of ever increasing size

or from a small to a larger home after striking a good deal. In general, it is still true today that foreign embassies or repatriating Hungarians are to be found at the end of such chains because not even the Hungarian superrich can pay cash for the villas that sell for 100 million forints (King Matyas Avenue, Sandor Endrody Street).

The means of getting rich that is familiar to most of us is tourism and catering. The Hotel Victoria, the Paradiso Bar, and the Legrady Restaurant are well known, but some residential hotel chains at Lake Balaton bring in a lot more. In the latter, it is easy to step over the almost invisible line between legitimate and illicit. In many places, tourism is connected with the sex industry, and single-owner conglomerates that operate prestigious restaurants, popular discos, and discreet brothels, which are camouflaged as topless bars, are emerging. It is not the Tax Office that rakes off the profits of these kinds of ventures, but it is harder to find out where these tens of millions go than in the case of the American mafia.

Overseas, the stock exchange is an important transfer station for black monies. Still, this too is different in Hungary, simply because the monthly net profit attainable in these industries cannot be matched even by the most venturesome stock market investment. (There are some silent partners in the network mentioned whose investments of one million yield monthly dividends of 200,000 forints.)

However, it is the business sphere that offers real wealth even in Hungary. Forty-three percent of Fotex's shares that were recently introduced at the stock exchange have a single owner who also has control of 49 to 50 percent of several other ventures in which Fotex has an interest. Calculated at current stock exchange prices, these assets are worth 2.8 to 3.2 billion forints. Dunaholding's shares, also singly owned, are rumored to be around the same amount. Gabor Ducso, majority share owner of Kontrax and the KURIR, does not even try to hide being a billionaire (although it is difficult to assess the worth of this firm because it has not yet been introduced to the stock market, it probably is still far from a billion), but the others are discreet. However, they share one common trait. All of them began with a mere few hundred thousand forints (with 5 million forints in the case of Fotex) five or 10 years ago and acquired their wealth as shareholders and chief executives of firms in the high-tech industries. This is also true of the other well-known firms such as Muszertechnika, Microsystem, and Rolitron. (Perhaps the only exception is Novotrade whose chief executive owns shares worth only a few million.) These assets do not provide their owners with high-class living because the profits stay in the producing firms. The maximum the future Hungarian Rockefellers allow themselves is a villa in the prestigious section of Rozsadomb, for instance, or a Mercedes or BMW, which are most times registered under the firm's name. We will also probably have to wait for the great patrons and founders of foundations—perhaps until the second generation....

POLAND

Effects of Gulf Conflict on Economy

91EP0308A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 15, 2 Feb 91 p 8

[Article by (PS): "How Much Will We Lose Owing to the Gulf Conflict?"]

[Text] In the first weeks of the war between the allied troops and Iraq, its effect on the Polish economy is difficult to foresee. It depends on the duration of the conflict, its nature—whether it will be a war without resorting to means of mass annihilation or a total war, which involves a different scale of destruction—the solidity of political alliances and the possibility of the war's spread to other countries of that region.

One thing is certain, as the war incurs additional losses, this will entail price movements of crude petroleum and petroleum products. To be sure, the outbreak of the war has stopped the rise in the price of crude on the stock markets which had been initiated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last August. The price of crude at the beginning of the second decade of January was barely three dollars higher than last July (\$17 a barrel), although last December it had exceeded \$30 a barrel. But this stabilization may be only apparent. What then awaits the Polish economy?

Background material on this question was drafted by Docent Dr. Grazyna Ancyperowicz of the Institute of the National Economy. Her study is titled "Consequences of the War in the Middle East on the Polish Economy in 1991," and it comes with an appendix forecasting world prices of crude petroleum this year. Below we present highlights of that study.

* * *

The war in the Middle East has by now caused Poland to lose an estimated \$2.9 billion. That loss is directly linked to the suspension of economic cooperation with Kuwait and Iraq, and it may diminish if normal trade relations are rapidly restored.

But much greater overall loss (which is practically irreversible according to the study) has already been incurred and may be incurred owing to the rise in the world price of crude petroleum. Last year this had caused an increase of \$1 billion in the cost of Polish imports. Of major significance was the shortfall of 4 million metric tons in 1990, compared with 1989, in the shipments of crude petroleum from the USSR, and the fact that by then part of these shipments had to be paid for in hard currency. Likewise, there was the shortfall of approximately 500,000 metric tons of crude petroleum from Iraq, which that country was supposed to ship in payment of its debts to Poland. The price which Poland will have to pay this year as a result of the Persian Gulf conflict will be decided by the size of crude petroleum

shipments, the level of the world prices of crude petroleum, and the geographical structure of the shipments. Not one of these elements is as yet known, the IGN [Institute of the National Economy] study states.

Maximum shipments are interpreted as imports matching the processing capacity of Polish refineries, i.e., 16 million metric tons. The handling capacity of Port Polnocny and the Friendship Pipeline suffices to transport such a quantity of crude petroleum. Actually, however, the IGN study concludes, Poland will probably purchase a smaller amount of crude petroleum, about 13 million metric tons, owing to its payments difficulties. That would be not much more than had been purchased last year.

Assuming that the price of crude petroleum will fluctuate (or stabilize) at the level of \$25-35 per barrel, the importation of 13 million tons would impose a burden of \$2.3-3.2 billion on foreign trade. These expenditures could be lower if shipments from the USSR were to account for a substantial part of the overall shipments of crude petroleum. So far the price of Soviet crude has been 15-to-16-percent below the world price, owing to its lower quality and the savings in the cost of transportation and insurance. It is worth noting that, under the so-called indicative prices, the USSR had obligated itself to export this year to Poland 4.6 million metric tons of petroleum on a centralized basis. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations reckon that, once the [division of] powers between the [federal and republic] authorities in the USSR is settled, it will be possible to purchase about 3 million metric tons of crude directly from Soviet republics and drilling enterprises.

In estimating the world prices of crude this year, two assumptions were considered. First, that the size of the deposits does not curtail the supply of crude oil but, in view of their geographical locations, a decrease in crude shipments is to be expected. Given an overall annual output of 3 billion metric tons of crude petroleum, the already proven petroleum deposits will last for 45 years. The danger lies in the possible decline in the shipments of crude owing to the exclusion of Middle Eastern countries, which account for about one-fourth of world extraction and more than 40 percent of world exports. The other assumption is that the existing reserve production and export capacity is much greater than the gap in the supply of crude petroleum due to the cessation of shipments from Iraq and Kuwait. To be sure, the elimination of these two countries has caused a 10-percent decline in supply, but that gap is readily filled considering that the petroleum exporting countries maintain reserve extraction capacities of 10-35 percent.

The IGN study also considered three variants of crude oil prices, depending on the war scenario. A blitzkrieg completed within several weeks would result in prices of around \$25 a barrel, that is, \$175 a metric ton. In the

event of a total war and the destruction of a substantial part of extractive capacity in the OPEC countries, however, a single barrel of crude may cost as much as \$90 (\$560 a metric ton). The estimates of the consequences allow for the first two eventualities.

Assuming that the shipments of crude petroleum to Poland this year will amount to 13 million metric tons, the cost of importing it and purchasing petroleum products may increase—compared with the prices paid before the Middle Eastern crisis—by at least \$1 billion (at a price of \$25 a barrel). Any eventual further increase in world prices of crude would augment that cost and, given a price of \$35 a barrel, that increase in cost would amount to \$2 billion this year.

It is estimated that the increase in material costs due to the increase in the prices of crude petroleum will reduce the GNP of Poland this year by about two to three points compared with the previous forecasts. For comparison, the analogous indicator in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries is estimated at 0.9 point, with the growth rates of the Japanese and American economies to be affected most (1.2 points each).

Unlike the OECD countries, which assume that they will be able to offset about 40 percent of the increase in crude oil prices by increasing their exports, Poland lacks such a possibility, the IGN study states. Thus, it will incur a considerable negative balance of trade (its size is not estimated in the study). Should this danger arise, it will be necessary to restructure the imports of crude petroleum so as not to reduce its shipments compared with 1990. Any eventual relative decline in the growth rate of the Polish economy will be a lesser evil, the study states, than any eventual reduction in the imports of crude petroleum, since the latter alternative would not prevent the rise in material costs but may instead halt the growth of output and disorganize transportation.

The rise in crude petroleum prices expected for this year will coincide with the predicted program for curtailing or eliminating price subsidies for energy carriers in the Polish economy. This will markedly augment the cost of production and transportation, thus reducing enterprise profits. Enterprises will not succeed in passing on the increase in energy costs to consumers through increases in the prices of their products (relative equilibrium). Thus negative consequences that are difficult to estimate will appear. On the other hand, there may also appear a positive consequence in the form of a forced restructuring of production and modes of ownership.

Potential for Success of Coal Exports Detailed

91EP0256A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 23 Jan 91 p III

[Article by Barbara Cieszewska: "Polish Coal Exports"]

[Text] The world coal market is becoming crowded. Buying coal is not a problem at all, whereas a struggle is beginning to keep one's customers. Professionals of the coal trade are saying that so far even the impact of the war in the Persian Gulf has not been felt. The supply of coal and stocks are so high that, despite the movement of prices for oil, coal purchasers are showing no symptoms of a fever.

These phenomena are essential for Poland because we are still a coal exporter which counts. To be sure, in the 1970's we ranked second on the list of exporters, and by the end of the 1980's we slipped to the sixth place. However, we are still among the leaders. The following countries are in the lead: Australia, with exports of 113 million tons last year; the United States, 100 million tons; the Republic of South Africa, about 50 million tons; the USSR, between 32 and 35 million tons; and, finally, Poland, with 28.5 million tons. Colombia, exporting about 15 million tons, ranks behind us; Venezuela and Indonesia are becoming increasingly prominent.

Keen Competition

Worldwide coal production amounted to about 3.2 million tons in 1989 (data for the last year are not available yet). In recent years, China, with its enormous output of 960 million tons, has left behind the traditional coal powers of North America, Australia, and Eastern Europe. However, due to its immense domestic demand, China is absolutely not a player in the world coal market. In addition, China has tremendous problems of a technical nature with the processing, dressing, and transportation of coal; it is still not an attractive and reliable partner.

Last year saw the altogether record-breaking demand for coal come to 340 million tons, without a parallel in history. This was certainly associated with the economic recovery under way, as well as the situation in the Persian Gulf. Besides, as we recall, there was an abundance of coal on the market. At present, the recovery is gradually fading into a recession, while the supply is still high. Therefore, competition is becoming increasingly keen. Recently, coal exporters, even as large the United States, have been competing against cheap Australian coal (it is mainly produced by strip mining) and coal from the Republic of South Africa where, in turn, the wages of miners are almost eight times lower than in the United States.

Therefore, at present one has to fight for retaining his position in the coal market. The traditionally good reputation of a reliable partner, which Poland has gained, does not suffice. Last year, we exported 28

million tons. To this we should add half a million tons which have already been received from the mines but have not yet been paid for. This results in an amount of 28.5 million tons.

Therefore, last year's quota determining how much we can sell abroad was not achieved; it amounted to 30 million tons.

We exported 12.6 million tons of coal to socialist countries, that is, for rubles, whereas less than 16 million tons were exported to capitalist countries. This ratio would have been somewhat different, more or less 50 percent to the capitalist countries and 50 percent to the socialist countries, if it were not for the fact that since 1 July, the export of coal to the GDR, paid for in [German] marks, has been applied to the account of the second payments zone, or the capitalist countries. All indications are that a united Germany will be our largest trading partner as far coal exports are concerned. This is likely to be our largest market which will likely absorb 5 to 6 million tons of Polish coal.

Ministerial Limits

Commercial negotiations and talks are held in this industry toward the end of the year. Therefore, contracts for this year, 1991, were signed as early as November and December. What is the potential for Polish coal?

It is not easy to dislodge an old, proven partner from the world market (after the war, we only failed to meet our export contracts once; this happened in late 1980 and early 1981, but, due to the special circumstances, our partners "forgave" us our faults, and we did not pay a cent in penalties). Therefore, despite various troubles, it looks like we will export in 1991 no less than we did last year, and maybe even a little more—about 30 million tons.

However, these are only theoretical projections, because so far the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation has licensed the export of only 1.9 million tons of coal! Why so little? Is the growth of domestic demand expected to be this high, or is such a decline in output expected? All indications are that this is not the point. There is likely to be to a lack of farsighted thinking. It is worthwhile to recall what happened to the export of Polish coal last year because unequivocal similarities come to mind.

Thus, toward the end of 1988, Weglokoks specialists departed for commercial negotiations having only 1 million tons of coal at their disposal. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation issued a license for selling precisely this amount of coal in the West. Fifteen million tons were earmarked for the socialist countries; however, this had little to do with trade but was rather a compensation deal, because subsidies to these exports amounted to about 2 trillion zlotys in 1990.

Therefore, in theory we could offer only 1 million tons to the West, undoubtedly because at this time, as we recall,

even Prime Minister Mazowiecki appealed for increased production. It appeared that there could not be enough coal. Precisely the opposite happened. A mild winter, expensive loans, and a recession in industry combined to create a situation where we were increasingly beginning to choke on coal with every passing month.

Fortunately, coal trade experts had anticipated this. They had been aware that those who make their offer too late are simply left out of the market. They had signed contracts with our steady clients, actually selecting the most favorable price offers. However, in order to reduce the risk to a minimum, they had merely asked our clients not to take shipments of this coal in the first quarter. Almost as soon as they returned from the negotiations it turned out that we could export 7 million tons to the West. A month later, this statistic soared to 15 million tons, to finally rest at 30 million tons. In the last quarter, they even said that this level as well could be exceeded.

Worth the Effort?

Weglokoks experts maintain that this shows a lack of farsighted thinking, and that certain situations may be predicted with a high degree of probability. It is difficult to engage in trade in the environment of complete uncertainty.

Let us hope that this situation will not recur this year. All the more so because we will face a phenomenon which is new to us. It may so happen that the profitability of exporting Polish coal will become questionable.

Domestic coal prices are beginning to exceed on many occasions the ones we secure abroad. For example, if we add to the price of coking coal (it accounts for 24 percent of our exports, about 7 million tons last year) the cost of transportation which recently increased by 65 percent, the cost of transfers at the ports, and also take into account the fact that the net price of coal in the country in January and February increased by 20 percent, and the fact that a 20-percent revenue tax is levied on coal—it will then turn out that the price of the Polish coking coal (type 35) on the world market should amount to \$75. Meanwhile, at best \$54 can be obtained.

Therefore, it is crystal clear that in principle we should give up such exports. The problem is that our country will not absorb this amount of coal. Therefore, efforts have been made, so far in vain, to abolish this 20 percent tax, as has been done with the exports of fine coal. However, it is understandable that the budget does not want to give up the significant contribution of 1.65 trillion zlotys which Weglokoks paid in last year (before November) by virtue of the revenue tax on exports.

Specifics on Evictions From Housing Discussed

Military Housing

91EP0226A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 21 Dec 90 p IV

[Article by D. Fr.: "Eviction From Military Housing"]

[Text] The situation of a family left behind in military housing when, for example, the one entitled to it has died or left the quarters, is much worse than in accommodations subject to the regulations of housing law, says an ombudsman in a letter to the minister of national defense.

In the past, one condition for obtaining quarters was giving up possession of public or cooperative housing. Current law does not take this situation into account in the event of the loss of entitlement to military quarters. It also does not deal with various situations that have major significance for the housing situation. The practice of clearing quarters lies essentially in evicting people directly to the place where they were last permanently registered, often without regard to the passage of time since leaving that place. For example, complaints have come to the ombudsman about evictions to places where the person remaining in the quarters lived several years before.

This rule is applied almost automatically. Such automatic action, in the ombudsman's view, is unacceptable because it violates the law to a significant degree. Because the housing law provides that in the event of the tenant's death, persons remaining on the premises may be moved to housing in which they lived previously, if the period of their occupying it to the time of the tenant's death is less than two years. If there is no such possibility, they are assigned substitute housing. Nor does any regulation under the law use the notion of permanent registration. Therefore, practices of this kind, says the ombudsman, are completely without legal foundation. They lead to flagrant violations of the law. This applies both to unsound legislation—the still binding law of 1976 on quartering the armed forces, and administrative practice. Both the former and the latter require changes today.

Civilian Housing

91EP0226B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 21 Dec 90 p II

[Article by A.Z.: "Squaring Evictions: Discussion of Effects, Not Causes"]

[Text] There are approximately 7 million apartments in the cities. To date the courts have ordered 20,000 evictions of burdensome occupants, persons illegally and wrongfully occupying apartments, or spouses after a divorce. As is now apparent, these are a mere fraction of the housing problem. And what will happen when percentages come into play. The percentage of people who simply cannot afford to pay increasing rent payments is growing every day.

On the other hand, after acknowledging, and rightfully so, a citizen's right to his own property, one can anticipate pressure by homeowners for eviction of tenants who, through no fault of their own, received allotments from the state housing office and make all payments regularly.

The threat of being thrown out into the streets with no replacement option is appearing more and more often in the "conversation of Poles." Here and there in Poland, it is coming to the situation where, by virtue of the loftiness of a court order, one should evict people just because they are occupying rooms in private homes. Severe conflicts are breeding, demagogic slogans are finding expression, and the predominance of emotion over reason is beginning to appear on the horizon.

On a recent Thursday, in a "Tygodnik Budowlany" series [aired] on 20 December, both sides, homeowners and tenants, met. It was to be a meeting aimed at finding a sensible position on the problem of evictions. For the most part it became a discussion on the right to eviction. As one listened to stories of specific instances on both sides, demagogic behavior, marked by ill will between tenants and homeowners, one could expect to deal with a squaring of the eviction problem.

The problem lies in political and economic, not social and moral categories. Extreme examples like those referred to in the discussion will not speed up resolution of this matter.

If one looks for converging points, then the right to evict without compensation or finding replacement accommodations should apply to people wrongfully occupying housing, vandals, and people who are a burden to those around them. But it is precisely in these matters that

eviction proceedings are carried out with with exceptional difficulty. Rarely, as in the event of divorce, does the court orders a division of housing. It is easier to render a decision on the eviction of one of the partners. Yet it is not specified who and how this action is to be carried out. Indeed, it is similar when evicting a tenant from a private home, in a situation where none of the instances mentioned above comes into play (i.e., after the death of the main tenant).

The Thursday discussion was a discussion of effects, not causes. Yet the main cause is a deficit of 1.5 million apartments in Poland. The problem would be different in a situation where the scale of housing needs was much smaller. On one point there is no discussion; all legal decisions in the matter must take into account the equality of tenants before the law, those from cooperative, company, and municipal as well as private homes. Otherwise a series of mutual accusations and mutual malice will begin.

The Thursday meeting clearly showed that evictions should be limited to specific, extreme cases. For there are many middle roads that serve to resolve conflicts between owner and tenant. Reaching for the ultimate weapon in any case may lead to further stratification in society, to further conflict, as well as to judgments handed down in the name of the Republic of Poland with which no one will comply.

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